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The three essays in this dissertation look at the distribution and effects of resources
in education. The first two essays examine the effects of the Abbott school finance
reforms that increased the resources available to low-wealth school districts in New
Jersey. The third essay provides a framework for thinking about the distribution of
resources in a system of public higher education.
The first essay is an empirical analysis of the effects of the Abbott school fi-
nance reform on educational expenditures in New Jersey. This reform dramatically
increased the funding available to poor, urban schools with the goal of improving
achievement in those districts. My analysis suggests that districts directed the added
resources largely to instructional personnel. They hired additional teachers and sup-
port staff.
The second essay asks the obvious next question: Did this increase in funding
and spending improve the achievement of students in the affected school districts?
I focus primarily on the statewide 11th grade assessment that is the only test that
spans the policy change. I find that the policy improves test scores for minority
students in the affected districts by one-fifth to one-quarter of a standard deviation.
The third essay, written with James M. Sallee and Paul N. Courant, looks at the
1
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optimal provision of public higher education. We provide a simple model that shows
that a tiered system of higher education, where students are sorted into schools by
ability as we see in the U.S., is optimal with just a few assumptions. Our results are
driven by an assumption that ability and resources are complementary.
CHAPTER II
The Effects of the Abbott School Finance Reform on
Education Expenditures in New Jersey
2.1 Introduction
Despite a large literature on the effects of resources in education, there is no
consensus on the effects of money in schools. Research has been inconclusive because
many of the inputs to student achievement are difficult or impossible to measure
and also because the observable aspects of schooling are the result of choices of
individuals and several levels of government, with different incentives and goals. A
recent court case in New Jersey offers the opportunity to shed new light on the topic
of how increased state funding for local school districts affects their educational
expenditures. In 1997, the fourth ruling in the Abbott v. Burke school finance
lawsuit in New Jersey ordered an immediate, unexpected and dramatic increase in
funding to 30 poor, urban school districts. This ruling provides a natural experiment
which I use to explore the effects of money in schools, and to ask what happens to
failing districts when they receive a sudden increase in available funds.
There are several explanations for the lack of clear conclusions about the effect
of school spending on student outcomes.1 One is difficulty in measuring both the
inputs and outputs of school systems. The expenditure data is often aggregated to
1See Hanushek (1996) for a review of this literature.
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the state level, which ignores important variation within states and relies on between-
state differences for identification. The appropriate outcome measures are also not
always obvious; states and researchers tend to rely on easily available standardized
test scores, but not all reforms are meant to raise test scores. Another important
factor is omitted variables. Wealthy students tend to go to well-funded schools and
have high achievement, but this is in part due to family preferences, choices, and
out-of-school investments. Disadvantaged students often receive large amounts of
compensatory funding, leading to high levels of aggregate spending, but still do
poorly in terms of measured achievement. The institutional structure of individual
schools is also typically omitted from these studies, but there are large differences in
the efficiency with which different school districts use their resources. In this study I
provide evidence on the effect of the finance reform both on aggregate expenditures in
the affected districts and on specific types of spending within schools. This allows me
to predict what student outcome measures are likely to be affected and to conclude
that the commonly used math and English test scores are unlikely to tell the whole
story in this case.
There is a consensus that poor and urban schools have worse inputs and outcomes,
even when their schools are well funded. For example, schools serving poor students
tend to have less experienced teachers and are more likely to have high year-to-
year teacher turnover.2 In this literature it is hard to convincingly disentangle the
contribution of schools to achievement from the contributions of families and other
external factors. To the extent that the Abbott reform changes the circumstances of
schools without affecting students’ families, the analysis in this paper makes progress
on this puzzle.3 Even without the strong assumption that the Abbott reforms affected
2See Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2004) or Reed, Rueben, and Barbour (2006).
3It may be too strong an assumption to say that the reforms didn’t affect families, but this is a plausible assumption
in the short term.
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only the in-school environment, a careful examination of the particular expenditure
changes allows me to identify outcome measures that offer a more nuanced view of
the effects of resources on student outcomes.
Through school finance reform, there has been a general trend since the 1960s
toward equalizing funding across districts within states. The vast majority of states
have had legal challenges to their school finance systems and most have instituted
significant reform whether or not their system was found unconstitutional.4 Mur-
ray, Evans, and Schwab (1998) look at the effects of school finance litigation across
the U.S. and show several broad effects. Court-ordered reforms reduced intrastate
inequality in school spending, and did this by increasing aggregate education ex-
penditures. Hoxby (2001) argues that, while within state inequality is reduced in
all equalization reforms, the vast majority of states have lower mean spending than
they would in the absence of equalization plans. In general, poorer districts receive
more funding as the result of these reforms because the changes weakened the link
between local wealth and school funding.
The Abbott reform is unlike the reforms in other states. Because the state leg-
islature resisted the court’s mandate to increase funding to urban schools for more
than 10 years, the court eventually instituted a new regime only for the districts
covered by the lawsuit. This ruling gave immediate increases in state aid to the 30
Abbott districts but left the most recent school finance law in place for all other
districts. This feature allows me to use the funding mandated by the court ruling
as an instrument for state aid to isolate and identify the effects of increased aid to
poor districts. The policy induced a significant change in funding to Abbott dis-
tricts, amounting to about 10% of average per-pupil spending statewide. Relying on
4See Minorini and Sugarman (1999); Evans, Murray, and Schwab (1997); Hoxby (2001); West and Peterson (2007)
and Hanushek (2006) for discussions of school finance litigation.
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within district variation over time and using longitudinal data from the Census of
Local Governments, I find that 60-70% of the increased funding goes to increased
educational expenditures. This fraction is high when compared to the predictions of
public finance theory, but it is similar to other empirical estimates of the flypaper
effect in school funding.5
The earlier studies can rarely look at where added dollars were spent inside schools,
but understanding the value of having the money “stick” in schools requires an un-
derstanding of both how much money was retained and how the schools used it.6 I
have put together data from multiple sources and have an unusually detailed dataset
which I use to examine how Abbott districts spent the additional aid. The increased
spending is focused on current K-12 expenditures, with about equal amounts going to
instruction and supplemental services. These categories seem like the most relevant
for improving student outcomes, but do not inform us about how the classroom ex-
perience of students changes with the added funding. Using data on school personnel
from the New Jersey Department of Education, I find that Abbott districts increase
hiring in several categories relative to a comparison group of districts. Abbotts hire
more teachers, tutors, and counselors. In high schools, Abbott districts increase the
numbers of music and art teachers, but seem to employ no additional math and En-
glish teachers. This suggests that Abbott districts are focusing on broader education
programs and not focusing only on the core subject areas covered by No Child Left
Behind, as reports have suggested about national trends.7 I find some evidence that
districts adjust their spending over time. The instructional expenditures scale up
5Hines and Thaler (1995) review the flypaper literature and report estimates of 40 to 58% for flypaper effects in
studies of effects of state aid to school districts.
6This is not a new idea in the education literature. See Cohen, Raudenbush, and Loewenberg Ball (2003). The
economic literature on school finance reform, however, tends to look directly from the finance change to student
outcomes without considering the precise uses of funds.
7See, for instance, Center on Education Policy (2007), which reports that instructional time for math and English
has increased since 2002 and instructional time for subjects not tested under NCLB has decreased.
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over several years, while Abbott districts direct money to capital spending only in
the first year of the policy.
Measuring the effects of the Abbott rulings is important because they provide
an example of one policy option available to states looking to improve education
in failing districts: increased resources. The Abbott ruling provided both dramatic
funding increases and specific mandates8 for the uses of those funds. These policies
improved the resources available to the affected districts, but the state has done no
credible evaluation of the results. In fact, the state currently has no mechanism in
place to allow for a credible evaluation.
The Abbott ruling, by creating an exogenous change in state aid, also allows a
clean test of what happens when states increase aid to school districts. Unlike many
other cases, the Abbott reform lets us identify the effects on low-wealth districts
specifically. In practice, the bulk of state aid is targeted to poor districts so these
are exactly the districts whose behavior we want to understand.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the Abbott
case, the school finance system in New Jersey and my data. Section 3 reviews the
literatures on resources in schools, the flypaper effect in school finance and previous
work on the Abbott case. Section 4 presents the empirical approach and results and
Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Background: The Abbott Reform and School Finance in
New Jersey
This section discusses the changes to New Jersey school finance over the last 30
years and the current system as it applies to Abbott districts and all other school
8A subsequent ruling in 1998 required additional funding to support specific mandated programs, including
phased-in universal preschool for three and four year olds and the implementation of whole school reform. Funding
also increased to cover the costs of these prescriptions.
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districts. I then describe the data I use to look at the effects of the Abbott reforms
and the selection of a comparison group of school districts used in the empirical
analysis.
2.2.1 Legal Challenges to NJ School Finance
Until 1976, schools in New Jersey were financed solely through local property
taxes.9 As in many states, this led to large disparities in funding levels depending
on local wealth. In 1970, the Robinson v. Cahill lawsuit challenged property tax
financing on the grounds that urban schools could not afford the disproportionately
high tax burden required to provide the “thorough and efficient” education mandated
by the state constitution. In 1973 the New Jersey Supreme Court agreed, leading
the legislature to pass the 1975 Public School Education Act (PSEA). Among other
things, the PSEA instituted a new funding formula to be supported by a state income
tax which, after significant contention between the legislature and the courts, was
instituted in 1976. While PSEA changed the source of funds, it did not successfully
reduce the funding disparity between rich and poor districts. State legislators from
this period suggest that local governments chose to use the income tax inflows to
reduce local property taxes without increasing school budgets (Comments at public
forum, May 23, 2006).
Abbott v. Burke was filed in 1981 on behalf of a group of students in four urban
New Jersey school districts. The suit argued that the new state financing law failed to
remedy the existing funding disparity and that these students were still not receiving
an adequate education. In 1985, the court found in the students’ favor, noting that
wealthy districts spent 40% more than poorer districts; the court also expanded the
districts covered by the suit to a group of 28 poor urban school districts, which
9This ignores Federal Aid, which was 9% of K-12 funding nationally in 1976 and is only about 4% of school
funding in New Jersey throughout the 1990s. (Digest of Education Statistics, 2006, Table 158.)
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are now known as the Abbott Districts.10 The first factor in designating a district
an Abbott district was that they must fall into one of the two poorest categories
in the state’s SES grouping scheme. The second factor was “persistent educational
failure.” In practice, this was measured by high failure rates on the state assessment
tests which had been instituted in PSEA. The Abbott districts shared several other
characteristics that were noted in defining the group: high local tax rates, high
percentage of non-white students and a large percentage of special needs students.
Abbott II (1990) was the first decision to impose a specific goal for the state to
meet. The ruling ordered parity in foundation funding between the Abbott districts
and wealthy suburban districts and required additional programs to address spe-
cial needs in Abbott districts. The court ruling defined parity in terms of “regular
education” expenditures and noted that the Abbott districts also have other needs
which require more funding than wealthier districts. This parity definition remains
the benchmark for funding in the Abbott case.
The early legislative responses attempted to legitimize the (relatively) low levels
of spending in the urban districts. The state passed several laws intended to satisfy
the court mandate without significantly changing the amount of funding for Abbott
districts. Enacted in 1990, the Quality Education Act (QEA) set a “foundation
amount” of funding that represented the level required to provide the mandated
education to all students. The court found in Abbott III (1994) that the QEA was
unconstitutional because the funding amounts had no relationship to the actual cost
of providing an education or the differences between urban and suburban districts.
The court overruled this legislative action but gave the state until the 1997-98 school
year to comply with the previous rulings requiring equivalence in funding. In 1996,
10Two additional Abbott districts, Neptune and Pemberton, were added in 1998 and one, Salem City, in 2004,
bringing the current total to 31. Since Salem City was added in 2004 and my data ends there it is not considered an
Abbott district in my analysis.
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the state responded by enacting the Comprehensive Education Improvement and
Financing Act (CEIFA). This new act added clear standards for what constitutes a
thorough education in terms of defined educational standards and instituted testing
to assess compliance with the standards. However, the CEIFA definition of adequate
funding was based on a model school district that did not reflect the needs of Abbott
districts and arrives at funding values very close to the figures in the QEA. In both
laws, the funding values were not related to the education standards but seemed to
be based on the past spending levels.
The court found in Abbott IV (1997) that the funding levels set in CEIFA were
chosen arbitrarily and based on no careful study of what is necessary or adequate to
reach the goal of providing a thorough education. The Abbott IV ruling specifically
required that the state undertake a study to determine what is necessary to provide
an appropriate education in the Abbott districts and how much this will cost. Later
rulings mandated additional programs, including building improvements, universal
pre-school and specific whole school reform programs. These additional programs
restricted districts’ choice in the use of funds, but districts still had the option of
reevaluating and changing their existing spending patterns as these new funds and
mandates were added.
Most importantly, Abbott IV instituted “parity aid” to bring per-pupil regular
education funding in the Abbott districts to the level of funding in the wealthiest
school districts. The specific amount of aid a district gets is determined by the gap
between that district’s regular education funding and the average regular education
funding of the group of wealthy districts.11 In addition to this parity aid, poor
schools in general and the Abbotts specifically get significant additional funding from
11Regular education funding is defined as the foundation amount of funding plus optional local levies.
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the state and federal governments based on the characteristics of the local student
population.
The parity aid is the portion of funding that can potentially be thought of as
exogenous. The state had successfully held off the court mandate for more than
15 years, and while funding to Abbotts began to increase in 1992 as a result of
QEA, the funding changes starting in 1997-98 were dramatically larger. The state
passed a new funding law, CEIFA, by the 1997 deadline set by the court and could
have reasonably expected another round of litigation but not an immediate funding
mandate. To demonstrate the magnitude of the mandate, Figure 2.1 shows average
parity aid over time. The parity aid adds an average of $1000 per pupil to the budgets
of the Abbott districts in 1998 and this increases to nearly $1500 per pupil in 2004.
This is a significant budget increase for affected districts, representing roughly 10%
of mean total expenditures per pupil in New Jersey.
2.2.2 The Current Finance System in NJ
Although the 1996 school funding law, CEIFA, was challenged in court and over-
turned with respect to the Abbott districts, the basic funding formula from this law
remained in effect through 2007-08 for all other districts.12 The foundation bud-
get, which represented 53% of the total state education budget in 1999, sets a base
amount of per pupil funding for the entire state. A district’s actual funding weights
this amount by the grade level of students, where elementary students are assigned a
weight of 1.0, and middle and high school students are weighted more heavily. This
is the foundation amount meant to support the core curriculum standards laid out in
CEIFA. In 1999, the base amount was $6,899 per student and this is indexed to the
CPI. The source of funds (state vs local) depends on local property wealth. Poorer
12A new finance law way passed in January 2008 which aims to end the Abbott designation and separate funding
scheme. The NJ Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the constitutionality of this law.
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districts get a much larger portion of their budget from the state, while wealthier
districts pay more locally. In addition to the foundation budget, districts receive
“Adjustments for Special Factors,” which are largely made up of various types of
aid to poorer districts plus the Abbott parity aid. Other budget categories such as
transportation and special, bilingual, and early childhood education are added on to
the foundation budget. These ajustments are not included in the parity calculation
because they are not part of the “regular education” budget.
Figure 2.2 is an illustration of the basic finance system in place in New Jersey, with
district property wealth on the X-axis and per pupil “regular education” spending
on the Y-axis. The flat solid line is the foundation amount. In New Jersey this
is calibrated to the cost of providing a “thorough and efficient education” and is
referred to as the “T & E budget.”13 Any district can choose to tax itself more
heavily to increase spending above the foundation amount.14 The full amount of
regular education spending is the sum of the foundation amount and the optional
local levy and this is shown by the upward sloping dashed line. The share of the
foundation funding that is raised locally is determined by local property wealth —
poorer districts receive more state aid and raise correspondingly less locally.15 The
state share is given by the downward sloping dotted line.
In Figure 2.2, the amount paid by the state to a given district is shown by line
segment AB and the amount raised locally is segment BC. The amount above the
13This foundation amount is meant to be the amount that supports mastery of the Core Content Curriculum
Standards, codified in CEIFA, and these standards also define the current understanding of a “thorough and efficient”
education. It is important to note that this benchmark is far above the interpretation of the constitutionally required
public education in many other states. For example, the ongoing case in New York, Campaign for Fiscal Equity v.
State of New York, refers to a “sound basic education,” presumably a lower bar, but the 2006 ruling called for a
funding increase of $5 billion per year for New York City alone.
14New Jersey does have a spending cap which limits year-to-year growth in district expenditures. This cap can be
overturned by local vote and the cap can be appealed if the increase is due to enrollment growth. In practice, actual
expenditure growth is significantly higher than the cap, implying that the cap is not actually binding. (Personal
communication with NJDOE officials.)
15State aid is determined by a formula that incorporates both property wealth and community income, but only
wealth is included here to simplify the graph.
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T & E budget, line CD, is the optional local levy. Abbott districts tend to be
grouped along the low end of the property wealth scale, although some districts
have experienced increases in wealth over the years since the Abbott designation was
assigned. The other poor districts overlap with the Abbotts and extend to the right,
followed by the middle income districts and, at the far right, the wealthy or I and J
districts. These wealthy districts are referred to as the “I and J districts” because
they fall into the highest, or I and J groups, on the state’s SES scale. The calculation
of parity aid is shown in the top left corner of the figure. For an Abbott district, the
amount of parity aid received in 1997-98 was determined by subtracting their chosen
spending level from the average spending for I and J districts.
After 1997, the Abbotts automatically received the regular education budget of
the wealthiest districts, regardless of their local contribution. This suggests a clear
incentive for Abbott districts to reduce their optional local levy to zero and allow the
parity formula to replace this with state aid. To prevent this, New Jersey included
a maintenance of effort requirement. The Abbott districts cannot reduce their per-
pupil property tax levy below the 1997 aggregate (as opposed to per pupil) level.
2.2.3 Data
I combine annual school district level data from several data sources to create
a unique longitudinal dataset to investigate the effects of the Abbott reforms. I
construct a panel covering 1990-2004 on school district funding, expenditures and
student characteristics. The main financing variables come primarily from the Census
of Governments Survey of Local Governments School Systems Survey, the F-33 data.
I use the longitudinal file for 1990-2002 which is available from the US Department of
Education’s National Center for Education Statistics, and append the 2003 and 2004
files. I supplement these data with parity aid figures from the annual New Jersey
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State Aid Summaries. I add district-level tax data from the New Jersey Division of
Taxation Annual Reports and income and property value information obtained from
the NJDOE Finance Department. All financial variables are adjusted for inflation
using the Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers (CPI-U) and measured in
year 2000 dollars. When referring to a year of data, I use the spring of the school year
— referring to the 1990-91 data as 1991. The first year of the Abbott parity aid is the
1997-98 school year, or 1998. The aggregate finance variables have observations back
to 1990 but the local tax and student variables begin in 1995 or later. I also add
data from the New Jersey School Report Cards to look at student characteristics
and school-level spending indicators.16 To look at the actual staffing decisions of
districts I use New Jersey’s Certificated Staff Reports. These files report the salary,
age, experience, education and job code for every staff member in a position which
requires certification from the state. This includes all classroom teachers as well
as superintendents, principals and educational support personnel.17 This results in
a richer data set than has been used before to study the effects of school finance
reform, allowing me to examine the aggregate effects on school expenditures and
specific school level effects of these funds.
My analysis will rely heavily on categories of spending and funding reported in the
Census of Governments F-33 Survey. Table 2.1 lists the main categories and subitems
covered in this survey. The parity aid created by the court ruling in 1997 does not
appear separately in this form but shows up in the data as part of “Compensatory and
basic skills attainment programs” (which I will call Compensatory Aid or Comp Aid),
subcategory number four under State Revenue. I subtract parity aid (obtained from
16More information on these data is included in the data appendix.
17Here I use the cross sectional information from these files, collapsed to the district level. In related work, I match
the information on the same teachers over time to create a longitudinal database to look at hiring and retention
patterns.
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New Jersey Department of Education (NJDOE) publications) from Compensatory
Aid and use “Parity Aid” and “Other Comp Aid” separately in the analysis that
follows.
The expenditures side of the survey includes total salaries (and benefits) for each
subitem under Instructional Programs. Changes in these items could result from
increased hiring or from higher salaries to the same staff. I use data on the salaries
of all certified staff in school districts since 1996 to further examine the patterns in
hiring.
2.2.4 Selection of a Comparison Group
The court ruling, by choosing the most disadvantaged urban districts, created a
situation where it would be difficult to credibly evaluate the effects of this policy
against a control group of unaffected districts. However, the case does provide sig-
nificant variation in parity aid among Abbotts. In 1998, the first year of the policy,
three Abbott districts received no parity aid and the largest amount was $1614 per
pupil in the City of Orange. There is also variation among the Abbott districts on
many other dimensions. For example, the average community income per pupil in
1996 for Abbott districts is $68,663, but the highest is $280,000 in Hoboken and the
lowest is only $23,400 in Camden. There is at least one district, Atlantic City, that is
similar to the Abbott districts on all dimensions except the local tax base. Atlantic
City receives adequate local funding from casino revenues, but the characteristics of
the student population line up well with the Abbott districts.18 Ideally, my analysis
would have a control group of districts that look just like the Abbotts but were not
subject to the Abbott reforms. To approximate this using the available data and
18For example, the average income per pupil, fraction of students receiving free lunch, fraction of students who are
black, and fraction of students who are hispanic in Atlantic City are all within one standard deviation of the Abbott
average.
16
natural experiment, I create a comparison group by selecting the districts which are
most like the Abbott districts.
Since the Abbott designation was assigned in 1985 and based on the state SES
classification using 1980 census data, change over time in New Jersey may have re-
sulted in more similarities between groups in 1997 than existed in 1980. To take
advantage of these similarities and reduce the likelihood that outliers among the
non-Abbott districts are driving the results, I use data from 1996 to identify an
appropriate comparison group. I flag districts that have values below the 10th per-
centile of the Abbott districts for percent of students eligible for free lunch, district
enrollment, or district unemployment rate, and above the 90th percentile for percent
white, district income per pupil, or equalized property value per pupil, and exclude
districts that have more than two flags. This excludes one Abbott district, 28 of the
other 51 districts in the three poorest state SES categories, and all but one of the
districts in the five wealthier categories.
Because my empirical strategy uses district fixed effects, the key coefficients are
identified using within-district variation in parity aid over time. The purpose of the
comparison group is to identify the state average levels of funding and expenditures
in each year. Table 2.2 presents means of key variables for Abbotts, the selected
comparison group and all other K-12 districts.19 The Abbott districts do look signif-
icantly different from other K-12 districts. They are on average larger, poorer and
serve larger fractions of minority, special education and limited English proficient
students. Although the differences are smaller, the Abbotts are significantly worse
off than the selected comparison group on most measures. Because the compari-
son group is used to identify state-level effects, my empirical strategy requires that
19New Jersey has roughly 600 school districts, but this number includes many specialized districts such as K-6, 7-12
and special vocational districts. All Abbott districts are K-12 districts. To facilitate comparisons across districts, I
include only K-12 school districts, a total of 214 districts.
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statewide changes affect the Abbotts and the comparison group similarly. I present
results in Section 4 using alternate selection methods to verify that the sample se-
lection is not driving my results.20
Figure 2.3 shows all K-12 school districts in New Jersey and shows the location of
the Abbotts, the comparison group and the districts that are being excluded based
on this selection criteria. The figure demonstrates that each group of districts is
spread throughout the state. It is not the case that the Abbotts are all located in
one area and the comparison districts are located in a different area of the state. The
larger districts in the lower portion of the map tend to be more rural and the many
geographically small districts that are clustered together tend to be more urban.21
The bulk of the population of New Jersey is located across the middle of the state,
between Philadelphia and New York City.
The Abbott average minus the comparison group average of Parity Aid and Comp
Aid are graphed in Figure 2.4. The between-group difference in Compensatory Aid
is between $200 and $500 before 1997 and jumps to $1000 when Parity Aid is intro-
duced. After 1997, Other Comp Aid is the area between the two lines. The increase
in Other Comp Aid beginning in 2000 is driven by additional programs mandated
by later Abbott judgments. The Abbott rulings in 1997 and 1998 laid out clear
mandates regarding funding levels and necessary programming. The court required
the state to fund the Abbott districts at a high level, with the intention of improving
student outcomes. Two necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for the money to
have an effect on students are that the funding was used for school expenditures and
20The alternate strategies include specifications that used all districts, all “Other Poor” districts, samples that
dropped all central cities (mostly Abbotts), that used all districts weighted by inverse probability weights, and
samples trimmed of observations with low probabilities of being an Abbott district. Both probability measures are
predicted using a logit model of the likelihood of being an Abbott district based on 1996 district level characteristics.
The results are qualitatively the same over all specifications so I present the results from the most transparent
selection scheme in the text.
21The analysis sample covers 38% of total K-12 enrollment in 2000.
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that those expenditures were related to student achievement. The next section looks
to the existing literature for predictions about the effects of increased state aid in
the Abbott case.
2.3 Previous Literature and Predictions
This paper, while focusing on the expenditure effects of the Abbott reforms, con-
tributes to several strands of the existing literature. The public finance literature on
intergovernmental transfers and the flypaper effect offers predictions for the amount
of state aid that passes through to expenditures. Several papers about the effects of
different expenditure types and on New Jersey speak to the possible uses of funds
and the ultimate effects of this spending. I discuss each of these in this section.
The public finance literature about the flypaper effect dates back to Bradford and
Oates (1971) who model intergovernmental grants as the result of majority voting
decisions. They conclude that local governments, acting on behalf of local citizens,
should treat lump-sum grants from the state as increases in local income. This implies
that local governments would spend the same fraction of grant income as they do a
dollar of additional local income. A common estimate of this is 5%. The flypaper
effect refers to the phenomenon that “money sticks where it hits,” in the sense that
intergovernmental grants targeted to a specific purpose are spent at a higher rate
than the propensity to consume out of local wealth or other income.22 The puzzle
of the flypaper effect is that the empirical evidence shows consistently that localities
spend much more than 5% of lump-sum state grants. Hines and Thaler (1995) report
estimates of 40% to 58% for flypaper effects in studies of the effects of state aid to
local school districts.
Moving to education expenditures and funding, Fisher and Papke (2000) review
22See Hines and Thaler (1995) or Bailey and Connolly (1998) for a review of the flypaper literature.
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the theory and empirical evidence on how local governments react to different kinds of
education grants. They find that there is increased spending associated with all types
of grants, but also leakage across the board; local tax relief is a common use. Feldstein
(1978) and Gordon (2004) look at the effect of Title 1, the federal aid targeted to
poor students. Title 1 funding may be the funding stream that is most like parity
aid, in that it is directed specifically to poor students. However, school districts
may react differently to federal aid (Title 1) than to state aid (parity aid). Feldstein
finds that about 70% of Title 1 funding passes through to increased educational
expenditures. Gordon reports that expenditures increase dollar-for-dollar in the first
year following a change in Title 1 funds, but after three years there is full crowd out
of local revenue. Focusing on different types of local government structure, she finds
that the crowd out is occurring mostly in the county or city government contribution
to the school district. For districts with no city or county layer (as in New Jersey
where school district boundaries closely match municipal boundaries), she cannot
rule out zero crowd out.
Bedard and Brown Jr. (2000) and Betts (1995) provide evidence that differ-
ent types of expenditures have different effects on student outcomes. Bedard and
Brown Jr. (2000) use data from California to test the effects of different expenditure
patterns across districts on student test scores, arguing that the school finance sys-
tem and expenditure limitations in place there make district level total expenditures
orthogonal to district preferences. They conclude that a reallocation of $100 per
pupil from administration to instructional spending or a $100 per pupil increase in
total expenditures targeted to instruction moves a district up 5 percentiles in the
state test score distribution. Betts (1995) uses data from the Longitudinal Study of
American Youth and finds that traditional input indicators such as class size and
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teacher experience have little effect on student test scores, but that spending on
computer technology does predict student achievement.
Several papers look at local responses to past education finance changes in New
Jersey. Goodspeed (1998) examines the reaction of local property taxes to increases
and decreases in the New Jersey state income tax, using changes in the early 1990s.
In New Jersey the state income tax does not go into the general fund; it is required
to be used for “property tax relief” which means that it is distributed to localities (as
state aid to school districts and municipalities) and can be used to increase spending
by these local governments or to offset property taxes. He finds evidence of a flypaper
effect in both directions: the local property tax cut does not fully offset an increase
in the state income tax, and property taxes are not increased to completely make
up for a cut in the income tax. The magnitude of the flypaper effect he estimates is
similar to the studies noted above: roughly 70% of funding sticks.
Firestone, Goertz, Nagle, and Smelkinson (1994) and Firestone, Goertz, and Na-
triello (1997) use eleven case study districts to describe how New Jersey school dis-
tricts used their funding from 1992-97, when funding changed as a result of the
Quality Education Act (QEA) passed in 1990. This legislation was ultimately over-
turned as inadequate to remedy the Abbott disparity, but it did increase funding
to poorer districts and lessened the funding gap by roughly 10%. In response to
these funding increases, the authors found the largest increases in support for at-risk
students and for teachers. They also found sizable increases in health and social ser-
vices and supplemental after school, weekend and summer programs. The Abbotts
also improved their academic programs, adding advanced classes and hiring teach-
ers for specialized electives. The authors also discuss differences in decision making
processes between Abbott and non-Abbott districts. In Abbotts, the main commu-
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nication is between the central district office and the state but in non-Abbotts it was
between the district and the community. This is partly because the Abbotts were
not meeting assessment targets and therefore were under state monitoring, but may
also reflect differences in the organizational structure of the school districts. They
also find that, in all districts, allocation decisions seem to be at the district level, not
at the school or classroom level. This suggests that the district is the appropriate
level of analysis for looking at funding and spending decisions. Goertz and Natriello
(1999) find that districts tend not to alter their spending patterns much, even fol-
lowing large reforms. If this holds true in this case, then we can expect that the
added spending after Abbott IV went to similar programs. The support programs
for at-risk students could be expected to improve achievement or, if not improving
measured achievement, perhaps reduce dropout rates. The teacher support programs
might improve work conditions for teachers and improve teacher retention.
In sum, the previous literature makes several predictions for the fraction of the
state aid increase that passes through to school expenditures in the Abbott case, the
uses of these funds, and the eventual effects on student achievement. The flypaper
literature predicts that 40 to 70% of the state aid will go to increased school spending.
Many of the explanations for the flypaper effect rely on citizen misperception of or
inattention to the actions of local goverments, in this case the school districts. The
public nature of this case and continuing court oversight make it unlikely that citizens
were unaware of the added funds. The effects of this attention are unclear; the court
oversight would likely lead to a higher flypaper effect as it creates pressure to spend
the money on schools, but citizen attention could tend to create a smaller flypaper
effect as local voters may prefer tax relief.
The results from Bedard and Brown Jr. (2000) and Betts (1995) imply that the
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exact uses of the added state funding in the Abbott case will be useful in predicting
student outcome effects. If the bulk of the money was spent on instruction, as the
results from earlier funding increases studied in Firestone et al. (1994) and Firestone
et al. (1997) suggest, we will predict that Abbott students will perform better than
if the bulk of the added money was spent on non-instructional uses. The Firestone
et al. papers also imply that it is important to look at the specific focus of even
instructional expenditures — tutors for remedial education will affect different parts
of the student distribution and different outcome measures than increased Advanced
Placement offerings.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
This section presents my empirical analysis, beginning with a discussion of the
difficulties in estimating causal effects in education, my estimation strategy and the
instrumental variables used to estimate the effect of state aid on school district ex-
penditures. After describing the instruments I use, I present the results for aggregate
expenditures, measuring the flypaper effect in the Abbott case. I then examine how
other sources of funding changed with the added state aid and how specifically dis-
tricts spent the funds. Finally, I present suggestive evidence from personnel data
to describe hiring patterns for Abbott districts relative to the comparison group of
districts.
2.4.1 Difficulties in Estimation
In education spending, it is widely acknowledged that school districts with low
local wealth (which therefore tend to receive larger equalizing grants from the state
government) have relatively high education costs stemming from large percentages of
students with special needs (Minorini and Sugarman, 1999). These additional costs
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complicate comparisons of aggregate expenditures across school districts because,
conditional on a given spending level, low-wealth districts spend a larger fraction
of their budget on compensatory programs and fixed costs, leaving less money for
“regular education.” Put differently, if the cost of achieving a given level of education
varies across districts, then district-level spending figures conflate preferences for high
levels of education with high costs for providing any given level of education.
A school district’s total expenditures are a function of two things: local prefer-
ences for a level or quality of education and the costs of educating the students in
the district. School districts vary on both of these dimensions. Empirically, both
educational costs and preferences for education are related to local wealth and/or
income.23 Desired education is rising with local wealth and the costs of a given level
of education tend to be inversely related to local wealth. In principle, we can mea-
sure and control for wealth and costs directly, but preferences are unobservable. In
practice, even measuring educational costs is not straightforward (Yinger, 2004).
The funds used to support the chosen level of education expenditures come from
both external and local sources. External sources are primarily Federal and State
Aid but can also include grants from non-governmental organizations. Federal Aid is
almost exclusively compensatory and meant to compensate districts that have high
costs (such as Title 1 and Bilingual Education Aid) or low revenues (such as Federal
Impact Aid, which offsets lost property tax revenue from government-owned prop-
erty). These funds are determined by the characteristics of the student population
or district and are not a choice variable for districts. Local Revenue consists mostly
of property taxes but also includes payments from other school systems, revenues
from lunch programs, textbook sales and interest on assets.
23I will use wealth from here forward to refer to both income and wealth since the two are closely related and local
property wealth is used in most school funding formulae.
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Most of these funding sources are also correlated with wealth. The parts of state
and local revenue that support basic or “regular education” funding are directly
determined by local wealth through the statutory funding formula. The factors which
trigger compensatory programs are correlated with wealth, with high compensatory
aids typically associated with low wealth. The optional part of local funding, the
amount above the foundation level, tends to be higher in high wealth communities
and is based on the local preferences for education services. In New Jersey, the
regular education budget (which is the reference category for Abbott parity) is the
sum of the foundation budget and the optional local levy. This is the funding that is
intended to produce the locally chosen level of education. If compensatory programs
were accurately accounting for the different educational costs across districts, we
could subtract those programs out and the remaining funding would tell us about the
education preferences of localities. Since, as Duncombe and Yinger (2005) point out,
the compensatory programs are not accurately scaled to the true costs of educating
disadvantaged students, we cannot separate out preferences and costs.
2.4.2 Empirical Strategy
Regardless of local preferences or needs, the question at hand is how a district
responds to a change in external aid. If the district has already chosen the optimal
level of educational spending, a new grant should be treated as income to the locality.
The district may choose to increase spending on education slightly, but would also
be expected to increase spending on other public goods, including local tax relief. If
all preferences and costs could be measured, I would want to estimate the following
equation to measure the average propensity of municipalities to spend state dollars
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on local education:
Expendituresjt = α0 + βStateAidjt + γLocalIncomejt + δ1Xjt + εjt, (2.1)
where j indexes districts and t indexes time. Xjt encompasses all characteristics
of districts that affect expenditures, including local preferences for education and
other public goods, and any factors that lead to differential costs of education. A
significant difference between β and γ, the coefficients on state aid and local income,
would be evidence of a flypaper effect.
The feasible range of β is zero to one, with zero representing complete crowd-out
of other funds and one representing complete pass-through to educational spending.24
State Aid has several components. The largest are formula aid, determined by the
statutory foundation level of spending and the local wealth level, and compensatory
programs meant to help districts pay for needier students — both economically
needy and in terms of specific educational needs. Since these funds are meant to
offset high costs, this aid will go to higher-spending districts (controlling for other
characteristics), thus biasing the estimate of β upwards if the determinants of high
costs are not fully measured and controlled for. Optional expenditures are rising in
local wealth, so districts which choose to spend more for unobserved reasons will
tend to be ones with low state aid. This will tend to bias β toward zero. The net
effect of these biases is ambiguous.
Two main strategies are typically used to deal with these biases. One is to use
detailed cross-sectional data to attempt to control for all differences across districts.
Often studies are done at the state level, which allows researchers to abstract away
from residential sorting among districts within a state. This strategy relies on dif-
24β could be larger than one if increased funds crowd-in additional external funding. One could imagine a locality
using a grant as seed money to spur fund raising for a one-time project like a new building or sports facility. See
Andreoni (1998) for evidence that seed money increases charitable contributions.
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ferences in funding across districts or states for identification, and an unbiased es-
timate requires that there are no additional omitted factors. The second strategy
is to use longitudinal data and an exogenous shock to funding to identify within-
district changes over time. Longitudinal data allows the researcher to control for
stable differences between districts over time. Feldstein (1978) is an example of the
first strategy and Gordon (2004) of the second.
I will use the second strategy. The Abbott IV ruling in 1997 induced a sudden
change in state aid. Although the case had been ongoing for many years, the parity
aid mandate was a surprise. The parity aid induced by the Abbott IV court decision
provides exogenous variation in state aid that I will use to examine the relationship
between state aid and school district spending choices. This instrumental variables
strategy isolates the variation in state aid that comes from the court ruling and does
not use the variation that is associated with district preferences and needs. The
policy offers several possible choices for an instrument.
Figure 2.4 shows the variation that will be used under each of these instruments.
Instruments 1 and 2 use different combinations of the two variables graphed here.
Instrument 1 uses parity aid and other compensatory aid per pupil separately and
relies on the increase in parity aid between 1997-98 and 1998-99 and the increase
in other compensatory aid between 1999-2000 and 2001-02. The increased compen-
satory aid starting in 2000 was arguably less fungible than the parity aid because
the later Abbott ruling mandated specific programs to be added. Instrument 2 uses
only the variation in parity aid, giving a better estimate of the choices of districts if
their ability to direct the use of other compensatory aid is indeed constrained. Since
the increased compensatory aid is going to the same districts that receive parity aid,
Instrument 2 might be picking up some of the variation in compensatory aid and
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therefore gives an overestimate of the effect of parity aid. For this reason, I prefer
Instrument 1.
Instruments 3 and 4 are indicator variables for receiving the treatment of parity
aid. IV 3 uses the interaction of Abbott and a Post-1997 indicator. IV 4 adds
an indicator for Abbott*Post-2000 to capture the second increase in aid. These
instruments do not use the between-district variation in parity and compensatory
aid, but they have the advantage of isolating the variation in compensatory aid
that comes from the 1997 ruling. The estimates using these two instruments are
equivalent to a difference-in-differences estimate comparing Abbott and non-Abbott
districts before and after 1997.
Table 2.3 presents the results of the first stage regressions for each of these instru-
ments. The first stage regression is the following:
StateAidjt = α0 + ρInstrument(s)jt + αj + αt + εjt, (2.2)
where j indexes districts and t indexes years. αj and αt are district and year fixed
effects. The values presented in Table 2.3 are the estimated ρ coefficients on the
instruments. All four instruments strongly predict State Aid to school districts.
Column 1 implies that a dollar of parity aid leads to an increase of $1.17 in state
aid and that one dollar in other compensatory aid leads to an increase of $1.16 in
state aid. The F-statistic for the joint significance of these two instruments is just
over 300. Column 2 reports the coefficient on parity aid when it is used alone, the
instrument in specification 2. When parity aid is used alone, one dollar of parity
aid leads to $1.53 in state aid. This coefficient is larger than the one in column 1
because it picks up the other compensatory aid that is increasing starting in 2000.
Columns 3 and 4 present the first stage for the two instruments based on exposure to
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the Abbott reforms. These two instruments give equal weight to all Abbott districts
including those that receive little or no parity aid.
Instruments 1 and 2 are valid if the amount of the parity aid is not related to un-
measured characteristics of the districts that are related to expenditures and change
over time. If you are concerned that the comparison group is not adequately control-
ling for year-to-year state changes25, you will prefer the estimates from Instruments 1
and 2 because these use the variation in state aid and parity among Abbotts over time
to identify both the year fixed effects and the coefficient on parity aid. These first two
instruments implicitly weight the districts that get the most aid more heavily. Since
the variation in parity aid among Abbott districts comes in part from pre-ruling local
revenue differences, IVs 3 and 4 may be less susceptible to contamination by other
unobserved variables.
2.4.3 Effects on Total Expenditures, or the Flypaper Effect
Table 2.4 presents the results for the second stage regression of total school district
expenditures on state aid using the four instruments described above. The OLS
estimate is included in row 1 for comparison. The regression equation is the following:
Expendituresjt = α0 + ̂βStateAidjt + αj + αt + εjt, (2.3)
where the Abbott IV decision and the related funding are used as instruments for
State Aid. The district fixed effects, αj, control for differences between districts
that are fixed over time. These fixed effects attempt to control for all permanent
differences between districts, including potentially observable differences in scale that
may lead to different expenditure needs and patterns, differences in the educational
25Because the district fixed effects control for time invariant differences between districts, the concern must be
that there are changes in state aid after 1997, correlated with but not caused by the court rulings, that affect the
Abbott districts differently than they affect the comparison districts.
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needs of students, and also unobservable differences in preferences for educational
spending and the efficiency of districts in using their resources. If these characteristics
are changing over the sample period, the fixed effects will not capture these aspects
and the estimate of β could be biased. The estimate will be biased only if the changes
over time are correlated with the instrument.26 The year indicators control for state
level changes from year to year that affect all districts similarly.
The coefficient of interest, β, tells how much of the added money from the policy is
spent on education in a given district. β is identified using within-district variation
over time for Abbott districts. The non-Abbott districts, through the year fixed
effects, help identify changes over time that affect all school districts equally. The
standard errors are clustered at the school district level to allow for within district
correlation over time.
Column 1 presents the estimates of the effect of state aid on total expenditures.
The coefficient of 0.66 in row 2 implies that 66 cents of every dollar of state aid
are spent on schools. The coefficient on row 3, which uses only the parity aid as
an instrument, is smaller than the estimate that uses both parity and compensatory
aid. One explanation for this is that the parity aid is indeed more fungible than
the other compensatory aid added later. The standard error in row 3 is also larger,
so I cannot rule out with any of these instruments that 80% of the funding goes to
education expenditures. Rows 4 and 5, using the policy dummy, give similar results.
The IV estimates in this table are not significantly different from the OLS results.
This may be because the differences between districts in preferences and costs that
may bias the OLS estimate are averaged out at the level of total expenditures. Some
subcategories, shown in subsequent tables, do show sizable differences. The estimates
26Inclusion of measurable district characteristics including enrollment, fraction of students classified limited English
proficient, and fraction of students classified as special education does not affect the estimate of β.
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do not vary much over the different instruments either. This pattern holds true in
the remaining tables, so to focus on meaningful differences, I report only the results
from instruments 1 and 3 in all remaining tables. This allows me to see any difference
between the instrument that uses within-district variation over time (IV 1) and the
one that uses only policy-level variation (IV 3).
To verify that these estimates of the flypaper effect are not being driven by the
sample selection, Table 2.5 presents the corresponding results using several different
comparison groups. The first row repeats the coefficient from Table 2.4. Rows two
and three report the coefficient from models that include only districts in the three
poorest SES categories (using New Jersey’s classification system) and that include all
K-12 districts. Rows 4-6 present estimates from specifications that exclude districts
that have a low probability of being an Abbott based on logit regressions of the
propensity of being an Abbott based on 1996 data. The results in rows 7 and 8
use similar logit models to create propensity score weights that are used to weight
the data from all K-12 districts. The results using these different sample selection
strategies range from 0.55 to 0.76 but all include 0.66 easily within the confidence
interval.27 These results suggest that the sample selection is not driving the estimates
of β.
Taken together, the estimates in Table 2.4 suggest that around two-thirds of
state aid increases go to increase educational spending. Column 2 provides the 95%
confidence interval for each estimate. The estimates are all also significantly smaller
than 1, meaning that there is some crowd out of other funding. Conservatively, using
the upper bounds of the confidence intervals, at least 10-20% of the funding is not
used for school expenditures.
27The data appendix provides more detail on these alternate selection strategies.
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2.4.4 Crowd-Out of Other Funding
To determine what funding is crowded out, Table 2.6 presents estimates of the
effects on other funding streams. Column 1 shows results for federal revenues. The
small and insignificant coefficient of 1.4 cents per dollar of state aid in row 2 supports
the conclusion that there is no effect on federal revenues. This is a reassuring result
because federal revenues are formula based and triggered by student characteristics.
No change here implies that the characteristics of the student population are fairly
stable across the policy change. The larger OLS coefficient in row 1 implies that
there is a relationship between high state aid and high federal aid that is not present
using the exogenous variation captured by the IV. Any leakage from the policy seems
to be coming through reduced local effort. Column 2 shows the estimates for total
local revenues per pupil, the funding stream over which the municipality has direct
control. This category is dominated by the local property tax, but also includes
tuition payments, fees for services, and revenue from school lunches and textbook
sales. Figure 2.5 shows the pattern over time in local property taxes per pupil. The
Abbotts were constrained by the court ruling from lowering their aggregate levy
from the 1997 level because of the maintenance of effort requirement. Unable to
reduce their levy because of the mandate, the Abbotts were able to hold it steady
in nominal terms; this translates to a gradual decrease in real terms, while the non-
Abbott districts raised their levies slightly over the period.
Column 3 of Table 2.6 presents the regression results for local property tax levies
for schools. The overall pattern shows a small negative effect, but this is not sta-
tistically distinguishable from zero in most cases. Column 4 shows the results for
the total local effective property tax rate. For this column, state aid is measured in
thousands of dollars per pupil. This combines all municipal property taxes, adding
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the local funding for all other public goods to the school taxes. Across the instru-
ments, the effect here is consistently about negative 0.10 percentage points per $1000
of state aid per pupil. The Abbotts were restricted from lowering the property tax
rate but are lowering their overall tax rates for all municipal operations. Figure 2.6
shows this quite dramatically.28 This suggests some fiscal substitution across munic-
ipal expenditures. One explanation is that schools are providing services that were
previously provided by the city, which allows the locality to reduce spending on these
services. For instance, one of the requirements of the 1998 Abbott ruling was that




Table 2.7 returns to the expenditure side and presents estimates for the effects of
increased state aid on the major expenditure subcategories. For reference, columns
2 and 3 are subcategories of column 1, and columns 1, 4, 5, and 6 add up to total
expenditures. There are large and statistically significant increases in current K-12
expenditures and its subcategories, instructional and support services expenditures.
The significant increases in expenditures as a result of an increase in aid are strongly
concentrated in the expenditures most directly related to student education — those
that affect the classroom and supplemental services. Row 2 of column 2 shows that
an increase of $1 in state aid per pupil leads to 42 cents of increased spending on
instructional expenditures. Instructional expenditures include salaries and benefits
28Another explanation for this is differential increases in property values in Abbott districts. Statewide property
values fell through the 1990s and recovered starting in 2000. The recovery for the Abbott districts began a few years
earlier than for the comparison group, but values in the comparison group grew more sharply starting in 2002 leading
to a rewidening of the gap between the two groups.
29Courant and Loeb (1997) discuss fiscal substitution as it relates to the Michigan school finance reform in the
mid-1990s.
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for instructional staff, so an increase in this category means that districts are spending
more money on teachers. This could mean that districts are hiring more teachers
or that districts are paying teachers more, so this finding alone does not inform us
about the number or quality of classroom teachers. The other significant increase in
expenditures is for support services, with an increase of about 35 cents per dollar of
state aid. This category covers a variety of functions which are broken out in the
next table. The results in columns 4 and 5 support a conclusion that none of the
added state aid goes to other current expenditures or non- K-12 expenditures. There
is a moderate, but statistically insignificant, decrease in capital outlays.30
Expenditures on Salaries
Support services, the category in column 3 of Table 2.7, encompasses several dif-
ferent functions. Table 2.8 confirms that, even within support services, the increased
expenditures are concentrated on categories that can be considered educational sup-
port. The pattern is the same as in the broader expenditure categories. The spending
increases that result from increased state aid are concentrated in the categories most
related to students’ learning environment. Instructional salaries show the largest
magnitude increase, 17 to 20 cents per dollar of increased aid, followed by pupil sup-
port and instructional support. There are small increases in administrative support
and operations and maintenance support and no change in transportation support.
For reference, column 1 in this table is a subset of column 2 in Table 2.7 (Instruc-
tional Expenditures) and columns 2-6 are subcategories of column 3 in Table 2.7
(Support Services Expenditures).
The fact that the OLS and IV estimates for total expenditures are very similar
30This may be due to the fact that the state took over all facilities construction for Abbott districts starting in
2000. This was also a result of the Abbott rulings, because the court found that adequate facilities were a necessary
part of a thorough and efficient education.
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while there are differences in the estimates for some subcategories implies that the
biases may wash out in the aggregate, but the specific spending patterns might
depend more on unobservables. For instance, the OLS estimates for the current K-
12 expenditure subcategories in columns 1 to 3 of Table 2.7 are smaller than the IV
estimates. This is likely because urban districts, which tend to receive more state
aid, have higher fixed, non-educational expenditures for things like building and land
costs, security, and transportation. This means they have less money to put toward
current educational expenditures, all else equal. Since these other costs are fixed, the
exogenous increase in aid allows them to focus on the educational programs. This
same pattern is seen in Table 2.8. The OLS estimates of the effect of state aid in the
first three columns, those most related to student learning, are all smaller than the
IV estimates. Columns 4 through 6 show no significant difference between the OLS
and IV estimates, implying that districts with different unobservable characteristics
spend similarly in these categories.
Within-School Spending Indicators
The results for expenditure and salary items from the Census of Governments
School Systems data support an interpretation that the money went primarily to
uses that could be expected to improve the educational classroom environment for
students. These expenditure categories are not entirely transparent and leave the
following question: How does an increase in instructional salaries translate to the
classroom? I use school-level data from the New Jersey School Report Cards to look
at several indicators within schools.
Table 2.9 presents the results for the effect of state aid on computer access and
the relative numbers of students and faculty. State aid is measured in thousands
of dollars, so the coefficient in row 2 of column 1 implies that $1000 of state aid
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per pupil reduces the average class size by 0.07 students. The results in column 1
suggest that class size is not affected in a statistically or economically meaningful
way in response to state aid. Column 2 shows a statistically significant decrease in
student-faculty ratio of a magnitude of about 10 times larger than the effect on class
size. The combination of these two results implies that Abbott districts have added
extra staff but not classroom teachers. If these extra staff are tutors or remedial
instructors they may significantly improve student learning for the students at the
lower end of the achievement distribution.31 Columns 4 and 5 attempt to measure
whether districts increased student access to computers. The data on the student
computer ratio and the fraction of classrooms with internet access are not reported
before 1997, so these estimates are quite noisy and do not provide any convincing
evidence that access to computers has changed for Abbott districts.32
Staffing Levels
To look more closely at the types of staff hired in Abbott districts, I present graphs
of the number of staff per 1000 students in several staff and teacher categories over
time. To create these graphs, I use the New Jersey Department of Education’s
Certificated Staff data collapsed to broad teacher categories at the district level.33
Figure 2.7 shows the average number of principals per 1000 students for Abbott and
comparison districts. Figures 2.8 to 2.13 show several other staff categories.
The numbers of principals (including vice principals), elementary school teachers,
high school arts and high school reading specialists are all increasing in Abbott
31Data on the number of AP subjects offered and number of students in AP classes would indicate whether
educational opportunities were also changing at the top of the student achievement distribution. These data are only
reported in the New Jersey School Report Cards for recent years, but in principle they exist for earlier years. I am
working on obtaining these data.
32I am pursuing additional data on technology resources from the state.
33These data provide significant detail on the characteristics and job assignment of every staff member in a position
that requires a certificate from the state. This includes all teachers as well as school administrators and many student
support positions.
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schools. In several of these categories any differential increase for Abbotts over the
comparison group occurs after 2000, perhaps as the additional funding is added. The
immediate increase in the number of principals makes sense as districts might want
more administrators to evaluate and direct how the new resources were used. The
number of elementary school teachers increased dramatically for Abbott districts,
from about 29 per 1000 students to about 39 per 1000 students, while the comparison
group rose from about 24 to 29.
Elementary school teachers is the only staffing category where the scale of the
change over this period is economically significant. The addition of one principal for
every 2500 students translates to a small increase in per pupil spending, about $35
per pupil. In contrast, the number of elementary school teachers rose from about 30
per 1000 students to about 40, or an increase of 1 teacher per 100 students. This
implies a much larger increase in spending on teacher salaries, matching the results
in Table 2.8 that show that the largest salary category increase is for instructional
salaries. Using the mean characteristics of Abbott districts in 2000, this would imply
hiring 94 more elementary teachers at a cost of $4,692,640, or $498 per pupil, per
year.34 Surprisingly, the number of teachers in the core subjects of high school
English and math decreased slightly for Abbott districts over this time. The changes
do not correspond exactly with the policy changes, and I discuss some explanations
for these trends in the next section.
Table 2.10 presents the regression results that quantify the changes shown in
these graphs. The table includes results for 22 categories of teachers and other
school district staff. The first column of results uses parity aid and compensatory
aid, IV 1. The coefficient of 1.4 in the third row says that for every $1000 in state
34For Abbott districts in 2000, the average number of pupils was 9419, the average salary of principals was $86,305,
and the average salary of elementary teachers was $49,385.
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aid per pupil and every 1000 students, a district hires 1.4 elementary school teachers.
The second column of results uses IV 3, the policy dummy, which can be interpreted
as a difference-in-differences estimate of the effect of the policy. Abbott districts
hired about 1.5 more elementary school teachers per 1000 students per year, relative
to the comparison group. There are only two years of pre-reform data, so I am
hesitant to interpret these coefficients as an accurate accounting of the effect of
added state aid on staffing levels, but these numbers provide a way to judge whether
the graphs are displaying a substantively important difference between the Abbott
and comparison groups. The only staffing categories that show significant increases
using both instruments are elementary school teachers, high school special education
teachers, and high school nurses. With IV 1, there is also a significant increase in the
number of teachers for high school art, music, physical education, and social studies
and in the number of high school counselors.35
2.4.6 Timing of the Expenditure Effects
To look at the dynamics of the effects of the Abbott policy on expenditures, I
estimate the following equation using three different time windows:
∆Expendituresj = α0 + ̂β∆StateAidj + εj, (2.4)
where j indexes districts and ∆ represents a 1-, 3-, or 5-year change with 1997 as
the starting year. The results of these regressions are summarized in table 2.11.
Each entry in the table is the coefficient β in the above regression for the time span
noted at the top of the column and the outcome variable listed in that row. For each
outcome, the first row is the coefficient for the regression with no controls and the
35The estimates using IV 1 have smaller standard errors, and therefore higher significance levels, because they use
the variation in parity aid within districts over time.
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second row includes 1995 values of total per pupil expenditures and total enrollment
as controls. These results show that there is significant variation in the timing of the
aggregate effects presented in the earlier tables. For instance, the estimate for the
one-year change in total expenditures for a $1 change in state revenue is 1.36, roughly
double the corresponding estimate from using the fixed effects specification and all
years of data. Reading across the row, the three-year change is 0.99 and the five-year
change is 0.76, implying that as time goes on the districts are diverting more money
away from education expenditures. The estimates for current K-12 expenditures
and its subcategories show that districts did not move to the eventual high levels of
spending immediately, but took time to ramp up. This is likely because the money
became available after staffing decisions were made for the first year of the policy. In
contrast, capital outlays, which show a negligible impact in the main analysis show
an almost dollar-for-dollar increase in the one-year change, but drops off to negative
but statistically insignificant changes in the 3- and 5-year analyses. This suggests
that districts may have used the influx of money in 1997-98 to complete outstanding
capital projects or to move up projects that were planned for the following several
years.36
The second grouping of variables shows the effects of state aid on other finance
streams. The first variable is total revenue, which is the sum of federal, state and
local revenue. The effects on total revenue are similar over the different time frames,
with a dollar in state aid translating to 75-85 cents of revenue available to the district
based on the point estimates. As is shown in the main analysis, the leakage is coming
through crowd-out of local revenues but not exclusively, or even primarily, through
property tax reductions.
36It is also relevant that the state took over capital expenditures in later years.
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The third grouping of variables, salaries, suggests that districts were scaling up
their spending in pupil and instructional support, but for instructional salaries and
operations and maintenance support the timing of the effects is nonlinear. Instruc-
tional salaries increase only about 11 cents per dollar of state aid in the one-year time
frame, but increase by 30 cents per dollar in the three-year window. The five-year
change is 0.16, in line with the estimate of 0.17 from the main analysis. Given the
large standard errors on the three-year changes, it cannot be ruled out that the effect
is around 0.16 at all time periods.
2.5 Discussion and Conclusions
Throughout this analysis, I compare disadvantaged districts that received a large
increase in state aid to disadvantaged districts that did not receive this funding
increase. While this does not inform us about how schools in general will react
to aid increases, it does provide evidence on the segment of schools that are the
subject of most concern. These are the districts that are struggling to meet state
and national achievement benchmarks and consistently show poor life outcomes for
their students.
The results described in Section 4 are promising for urban education policy, in the
sense that the bulk of an aid increase to disadvantaged schools goes into spending
that can be reasonably expected to improve the learning environment for students.
I find evidence that about two-thirds of Abbott parity aid passes through to schools
as increased expenditures on education. This is in line with, but at the high end
of, previous estimates of the flypaper effect in K-12 schooling. I find that the in-
creased spending is targeted to instructional expenditures and support services and
that the one-third of aid that doesn’t reach schools is explained by decreased local
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contributions. There are some puzzles to be explored and important caveats to these
results.
The staffing results are surprising in that there are no increases in staffing for the
core high school subjects that are the focus of current accountability policies. The
New Jersey Core Curriculum Standards, formalized in 1996, include standards for
art, sciences, and world languages at all grade levels, so all districts must cover these
subjects to meet their constitutional obligation to students. The national No Child
Left Behind (NCLB) law added pressure to focus explicitly on the core subjects of
reading and math. This could explain the leveling off in the number of art teachers
in 2002, but does not explain the decline in the number of high school English and
math teachers from 1999-2003. These categories begin to rise at the end of the time
period, perhaps in response to the NCLB pressures. Returning to the art and music
results, the comparison districts reduce staffing in both of these subjects after 2002
while the Abbotts continue to hire music teachers and level off in arts staffing. This
suggests that whatever pressures were introduced by NCLB to focus on core subjects
were muted for the Abbotts.
In further work on this topic, I explore the implications of these results for students
and schools. The next chapter in this dissertation looks at whether student achieve-
ment in the Abbott districts improves following the 1997 funding change. Because I
find no change in staffing for high school math and English, the state assessments and
national assessments commonly used to measure student achievement are unlikely
to show improvement in this case.37 My results point to other measures that may
be more appropriate. One hypothesis is that the increased numbers of counselors
and social workers may affect student retention or course choices. The dropout rate
37This is not consistent with what I find in the next chapter. I argue there that districts may have focused on high
schools in the short term but then pulled back in favor of elementary schools. The HS staffing estimates here are for
the full time period - I need to look at shorter windows.
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or a cumulative retention rate could be used to investigate whether Abbott districts
after the reform are more successful in retaining students. Data on the number of
Advanced Placement subjects offered and the number of AP tests taken would shed
light on increased opportunities for higher performing Abbott students. A further
examination of heterogeneity in spending among Abbotts may inform us about pre-
cisely which expenditures do improve student achievement. Given that the Abbott
reforms significantly increased spending on instructional and support salaries, a nat-
ural next question is whether these increases led to changes in the characteristics of
instructional staff. The effects of the added spending within schools on achievement
and teacher labor markets will be important to a comprehensive evaluation of the
Abbott reform.
Significantly, New Jersey has conducted no comprehensive evaluation of the effects
of the Abbott reforms. State officials point to promising improvements in early
literacy and to narrowing achievement gaps in elementary grades (MacInnes, 2005).
These results come from trends on tests that begin in 1998, after the Abbott reforms
were instituted. The court mandated an evaluation but the state has failed to provide
it; this is an important policy failure. If states are interested in learning which
expenditures have high returns they need to plan evaluations and define appropriate
outcome measures before reforms are implemented. The court mandated that money
flow to the Abbotts immediately, but districts had several years to implement specific
programs. At a minimum, the state could have undertaken a comprehensive baseline
accounting of the programs and expenditures in place in 1997, and developed a
strategy to evaluate the subsequent changes.
The Abbott case was unique in its selection of wealthy districts as a benchmark
for spending adequacy, but a recent case in New York City promises even larger
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funding increases.38 Substantial funding increases will improve schools only if the
money is spent in ways that improve the education of students. The good news in
this paper is that the money provided to disadvantaged districts in the Abbott case
did largely go to schools, and it was spent on things that can be reasonably expected
to improve student achievement: instruction and support services. The bad news
is that the state has not evaluated these changes in a comprehensive or convincing
way. Lessons from the Abbott case could inform the pending and future reforms
in other states. States undertaking major reform efforts may learn much from the
Abbott case, and approach reform with a better understanding of how difficult it is
to measure the effects of these reforms and with a plan for meaningful evaluation.
38In the Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State of New York case, the New York Supreme Court has ruled that an
adequate education for New York City schoolchildren requires an additional $5 billion of state aid per year. This is
roughly $5000 per student per year.
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Figure 2.2: Existing School Finance System in New Jersey
Sample Finance Schedule








100000 150000 200000 250000 300000 350000 400000 450000 500000























I and J Districts
Abbott Districts
45






































1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
 
All Compensatory State Aid Parity Aid
Difference in Compensatory Aids


















1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
 
Abbott Comparison Districts
Property Tax Levy per pupil
47











1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
 
Abbott Comparison Districts
Effective Property Tax Rate















































1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
 
Abbott Comparison Districts
Number of Elementary School Teachers



















1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
 
Abbott Comparison Districts
Number of High School English Teachers
49



















1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
 
Abbott Comparison Districts
Number of High School Math Teachers




















1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
 
Abbott Comparison Districts
Number of High School Arts Teachers
50
























1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
 
Abbott Comparison Districts
Number of High School Music Teachers





















1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
 
Abbott Comparison Districts


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for Estimation Samples








N 29 23 162
Enrollment 9351 3389 3317
Federal Revenue per pupil $699 $424 $189
Local Revenue per pupil $3,401 $5,470 $8,307
State Revenue per pupil $7,520 $4,165 $2,267
Compensatory Aid per pupil $608 $328 $97
Property Tax Revenue per pupil $1,791 $4,483 $6,767
Total Expenditures per pupil $11,599 $10,331 $11,136
District Personal Income per pupil $77,755 $91,671 $180,391
District Property Value per pupil $200,769 $341,759 $556,957
Effective Municipal Tax Rate* 3.45 2.96 2.57
Equalized County Tax Rate* 0.678 0.579 0.480
Equalized School Tax Rate* 1.336 1.453 1.500
Equalized Municipal Tax Rate* 1.523 0.996 0.621
Total Equalized Property Tax Rate 3.537 3.029 2.602
Class Size 22.16 22.90 21.60
Student-Faculty Ratio 13.66 14.62 13.93
Student-Administrator Ratio 308.28 305.60 322.42
Fraction of Classrooms with Internet* 28.96 24.22 26.59
Student-Computer Ratio* 8.63 14.84 11.69
Student Mobility Rate 4.2% 3.7% 2.2%
Percent Special Ed 4.8% 3.6% 2.6%
Percent Limited English Proficient 9.9% 5.1% 3.0%
Percent Asian 2.0% 2.9% 7.2%
Percent Black 39.4% 32.8% 7.0%
Percent Hispanic 32.2% 17.0% 6.7%
Percent White 26.8% 48.2% 77.5%
Percent Free Lunch 57.8% 33.8% 9.1%
*These variables are measured for 1998, the first year for which I have data.  
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Table 2.3: First Stage Results for Instruments
OLS estimates of First Stage for Instruments
Y = State Aid per pupil
Instruments
IV 1: Parity aid per pupil and other compensatory aid per pupil
IV 2: Parity aid per pupil 
IV 3: Abbott*Post97 indicator
IV 4: Abbott*Post97 and Abbott*Post00
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV 1 IV 2 IV 3 IV 4
Parity Aid 1.172 1.531
(0.087)** (0.102)**
Other Comp Aid 1.159
(0.070)**
Abbott *Post 1997 2,268.454 1,309.909
(155.206)** (187.810)**
Abbott* Post 2000 1,674.744
(203.431)**
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 9,445.348 12,342.234 11,951.250 11,539.487
(319.670)** (321.133)** (333.687)** (320.747)**
Observations 676 676 676 676
R-squared 0.93 0.90 0.90 0.91
F statistic 300.55 227.48 213.62 152.37
Standard errors in parentheses



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.10: IV Results for Effect on District Staffing
Estimates of Change in Staffing Levels Associated with Abbott Rulings
Model: Staff per 1000 pupils = α + βState Aid per pupil (IV) + γDistrict FE + δYear FE + ε
Coefficient is Effect of $1000 State Aid per pupil (instrumented with IVs 1 and 3)
Staff per 1000 students
(1) superintendents -0.0047 (0.0168) -0.0009 (0.0232)
(2) principals 0.0195 (0.0470) 0.1082 (0.0651)
(3) elementary 1.4171 (0.3220)** 1.5456 (0.5313)**
(4) hs art 0.1077 (0.0473)* 0.0679 (0.0535)
(5) hs business 0.0645 (0.0325) 0.0416 (0.0446)
(6) hs english 0.2676 (0.1758) -0.0823 (0.2646)
(7) hs foreign lang 0.0159 (0.0572) -0.0388 (0.0770)
(8) hs phys ed 0.1234 (0.0543)* 0.0153 (0.0800)
(9) hs home ec 0.0031 (0.0245) -0.0008 (0.0354)
(10) hs industrial arts -0.0542 (0.0376) -0.1118 (0.0822)
(11) hs math -0.0386 (0.1158) -0.2324 (0.1717)
(12) hs music 0.0704 (0.0326)* 0.0315 (0.0542)
(13) hs science 0.0765 (0.0516) 0.1364 (0.0915)
(14) hs social studies 0.0858 (0.0420)* 0.1205 (0.0710)
(15) hs special ed 0.5914 (0.2352)* 0.5908 (0.2742)*
(16) hs counselors 0.1200 (0.0500)* 0.1262 (0.0775)
(17) hs librarians 0.0286 (0.0188) 0.0423 (0.0421)
(18) hs nurse 0.0822 (0.0211)** 0.0747 (0.0339)*
(19) hs psychologist 0.0369 (0.0231) 0.0361 (0.0316)
(20) hs social worker 0.2874 (0.0580)** 0.2608 (0.0744)**
(21) hs reading/disab specialist 0.0391 (0.0438) 0.0422 (0.0730)
(22) hs speech specialist 0.0669 (0.0448) 0.0337 (0.0607)
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the district level).
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
IV 1 - parity aid and 
other comp
IV 3 - abbott* post97
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Table 2.11: IV Results for Timing of Expenditure Effects
Timing of the Expenditure Effects: 1-, 3-, and 5-year Changes
Model: Change in Exp per pupil =  = α + βChange in State Aid per pupil (IV) +  ε
1-year change 3-year change 5-year change
Expenditure Outcomes 1997 to 1998 1997 to 2000 1997 to 2002
Main Expenditures
Total Expenditures 1.36 (0.25)** 0.99 (0.46)* 0.76 (0.19)**
with controls 1.20 (0.23)** 0.89 (0.44)+ 0.60 (0.19)**
Current K-12 Exp 0.32 (0.09)** 1.14 (0.36)** 0.90 (0.12)**
with controls 0.31 (0.08)** 1.07 (0.34)** 0.78 (0.11)**
Instructional Exp 0.23 (0.07)** 0.70 (0.25)** 0.41 (0.07)**
with controls 0.27 (0.06)** 0.71 (0.24)** 0.39 (0.07)**
Support Services Exp 0.09 (0.05)+ 0.43 (0.13)** 0.48 (0.07)**
with controls 0.04 (0.05) 0.34 (0.11)** 0.38 (0.06)**
Capital Outlays 1.00 (0.24)** -0.11 (0.36) -0.13 (0.15)
with controls 0.88 (0.22)** -0.13 (0.35) -0.16 (0.16)
Revenues
Total Revenue 0.76 (0.17)** 0.74 (0.28)* 0.86 (0.10)**
with controls 0.78 (0.16)** 0.69 (0.26)* 0.79 (0.11)**
Local Revenue -0.24 (0.16) -0.29 (0.27) -0.16 (0.10)
with controls -0.23 (0.15) -0.34 (0.26) -0.23 (0.10)*
Property Tax Revenue -0.07 (0.04)+ -0.15 (0.13) -0.05 (0.06)
with controls -0.05 (0.03) -0.14 (0.12) -0.09 (0.07)
Salaries
Instructional Salaries 0.11 (0.03)** 0.30 (0.17)+ 0.16 (0.04)**
with controls 0.12 (0.03)** 0.33 (0.16)+ 0.18 (0.04)**
Pupil Support 0.03 (0.02)+ 0.07 (0.03)* 0.08 (0.01)**
with controls 0.02 (0.01) 0.06 (0.03)* 0.06 (0.01)**
Instructional Support 0.01 (0.01) 0.05 (0.03)* 0.08 (0.01)**
with controls 0.01 (0.01) 0.05 (0.02)+ 0.07 (0.01)**
Operations and Maintance Support 0.02 (0.01)** 0.08 (0.02)** 0.04 (0.01)**
with controls 0.01 (0.01)* 0.07 (0.02)** 0.03 (0.01)**
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Entry in table is coefficient on State Funding for IV =parity aid and other comp aid .
Note: For each expenditure category, the first row has no controls and the second row adds controls for 
1995 total expenditures per pupil and 1995 total district enrollment.
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Table 2.12: Summary Statistics
Sources and Summary Statistics for Estimation Sample
All financial variables are per pupil and adjusted for inflation (to year 2000 dollars)
Variable Source Dates Covered Mean Std. Dev. N
Federal Revenue F33 1990-2004 705 339 780
Local Revenue F33 1990-2004 4332 2335 780
State Revenue F33 1990-2004 6809 3066 780
Parity Aid NJ State Aid 1990-2004 317 603 780
Compensatory Aid F33 1992-2004 1252 1263 676
Comp Aid net of Parity Aid created 1992-2004 886 793 676
Property Tax Revenue NCES 1996-2004 2895 2457 468
Total Expenditures F33 1990-2004 11720 2663 780
K-12 Expenditures F33 1990-2004 10324 2259 780
Instruction Expenditures F33 1990-2004 6303 1412 780
Support Service Expenditures F33 1990-2004 3692 898 780
Non-K-12 Programs F33 1992-2004 161 117 676
Non-Instructional Current Expenditures F33 1992-2004 320 121 676
Capital Outlays F33 1990-2004 716 1107 780
Enrollment F33 1990-2004 6685 7887 780
Percent Limited English Proficient NJ Report Card 1995-2004 0.079 0.077 520
Class Size NJ Report Card 1995-2004 21.28 2.57 520
Student-Faculty Ratio NJ Report Card 1995-2004 12.92 1.92 520
Student-Administrator Ratio NJ Report Card 1995-2004 295 66 520
Student Mobility Rate NJ Report Card 1995-2004 0.039 0.017 520
Percent Special Ed NJ Report Card 1995-2004 0.049 0.026 520
Effective Municipal Tax Rate NJ Tax Report 1995-2004 3.17 0.71 520
District Personal Income NJDOE 1995-2004 89588 75845 520
District Property Value NJDOE 1990-2004 305913 236463 780
Instructional Salaries F33 1990-2004 4397 731 780
Instructional Support Salaries F33 1992-2004 277 149 676
Pupil Support Salaries F33 1992-2004 554 223 676
Administration Support Salaries F33 1992-2004 110 63 676
Oper. and Maintenance of Plant Supp Salaries F33 1992-2004 468 177 676
Transportation Support Services F33 1992-2004 90 99 676
Equalized County Tax Rate NJ Tax Report 1998-2004 0.66 0.33 364
Equalized School Tax Rate NJ Tax Report 1998-2004 1.26 0.32 364
Equalized Municipal Tax Rate NJ Tax Report 1998-2004 1.15 0.67 364
Total Equalized Property Tax Rate NJ Tax Report 1998-2004 3.08 0.73 364
Fraction of Classrooms with Internet NJ Report Card 1998-2004 0.738 0.367 364







NJDOE Requested files from NJDOE Finance Department.
Annual Census of Governments Survey of School District 
Finances.  
Downloaded from NCES website.  Mostly items from F33 that 
were not included on the longitudinal file.
Annual report of student and school characteristics and 
achievement results. 
Annual Report of the New Jersey Division of Taxation.  
Published on NJ Department of Treasury website. 





The data sources are summarized in Table 2.12 and are described in more detail
in this section.
National Center for Education Statistics Data
Census of Governments F-33 Data The school funding variables are taken from
the Census of Governments Survey of Local Government Finances School Systems
Survey, the F-33 data. I use the longitudinal version of these data produced by
NCES (William, McLaughlin, Glander, and Fowler Jr., 2006a), which includes data
from 1990-2002, and add the more recent single-year files for 2002-03 and 2003-04.
This dataset includes detailed revenue and expenditure breakdowns and enrollment
counts and is collected annually at the school district level. The longitudinal file does
not include the subcategories of local revenues. I downloaded property tax receipts
from the NCES website to fill this in for 1996-2002. The F-33 data are the same as
the finance data released by the state in the school report cards. These files can be
found at the following internet addresses:
yearly files: http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/f33agency.asp
longitudinal file: http://nces.ed.gov/edfin/links/findata.asp
New Jersey Department of Education Data
State Aid Summary The State Aid Summary is a breakdown of state funding for
schools, reported by statutory funding categories. Beginning with the 1997-98 school
year, these data are posted on the NDJOE website. I use parity aid figures from these
files. The 1997-98 State Aid Summary does not include parity aid because the State
Aid data was released before the court mandated parity aid. I construct parity aid
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figures for 1997-98 by subtracting total state aid in the 1997-98 file from the reported
total for 1997-98 in the 1998-99 file. These constructed values line up with media
reports of parity aid by district. These data are found at:
http://www.state.nj.us/education/stateaid/
School Report Card The School Report Cards are published annually by the NJ-
DOE and include, among other variables, school-level data on enrollment, staffing,
expenditures, results on student assessments. A longitudinal historical file covers
the school years 1994-95 to 2001-02. These files do not, however, include data on all
items back to 1995. Many items were only collected in later years. Yearly files are
available from 2002 to 2006.
I merge school-level data from 1995-2005 into one file. I collapse these data to the
district level, summing counts and taking enrollment-weighted means of rates and
percentages. The school-level data include vocational, special services and charter
schools, but I exclude these schools when collapsing to district level observations.
These data are found at:
http://education.state.nj.us/rc/
Certificated Staff Data The Certificated Staff Data are annual files of all teachers
in positions that require certification. The files cover all classroom teachers, be-
cause emergency certifications are only used for educational services positions such
as school social workers or school nurses. I requested these files from the NJDOE
Public Information Office and received them as electronic files on CD.
These data include name, year of birth, salary, experience (overall, in NJ, and in
the district), education (highest degree received), and information describing where
and what the teacher teaches.
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Other New Jersey State data
Division of Taxation Annual Reports provide effective total property tax rates by
municipality. These reports are available on the NJ Department of Treasury website
starting in 1996 (which provides statistics for 1995).
These data are found at:
http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/taxation/pubs.htm
2.7.2 Alternate Sample Selection in Table 2.5
Trimming Sample of Districts With Low Abbott Probability
Alternate samples were constructed by excluding districts that have less than
.1 predicted probability of being an Abbott district, using several different logit
models. The regressors that lead to each sample are listed below, but the broad
method was to run a logit where Abbott status is the 0/1 dependent variable and
the regressors include district characteristics or district and student characteristics.
Then the sample is created by excluding districts that have p̂ < .10. Sample 3
excludes districts classified as central cities in both the logit and the sample selection.
For Sample 1, the logit model includes median home value in 1989 and 1999,
median income in 1989 and 1999, 1996 effective municipal tax rate, 1996 average
sale price of homes, 1996 labor force, and 1996 unemployment rate as regressors.
Sample 2 adds the following school and student level variables: number of schools,
number of teachers, enrollment, fraction white, fraction free lunch, and fraction with
individualized education plan. Sample 3 uses the same regressors as sample 1 but




I construct inverse probability weights using the predicted probability of being
designated an Abbott district, using a logit model on 1996 (pre-treatment) district
level characteristics. For non-Abbotts, the weight is w = p/1 − p. For Abbotts the
weight equals 1. The weights are rescaled to sum to 1 within group. The regressors
for the logit models that lead to the weights are median home value in 1989 and 1999,
median income in 1989 and 1999, 1996 effective municipal tax rate, 1996 average sale
price of homes, 1996 labor force, and 1996 unemployment rate.
The goal of this reweighting is to make the non-Abbott districts look more like
what the Abbotts would look like had they not received the treatment of additional
funding. The reweighting places more importance on non-Abbott districts with a
high probability of being an Abbott and less weight on districts with a low probability.
This method allows me to use all the information from all districts.
There is one non-Abbott, Atlantic City, with a very high (> .9) likelihood of being
an Abbott. The student and city characteristics of Atlantic City match the Abbotts
quite well, but the city has a much larger tax base than the Abbott districts so did
not meet the municipal overburden criteria for selecting Abbotts. However, Atlantic
City has a higher weight than any other city and seems to drive some of the results
when using this method. I run a second version of the logit model that excludes
Atlantic City to generate a second set of weights.
CHAPTER III
New Evidence on School Funding and Student Achievement
3.1 Introduction
The Abbott v. Burke court ruling in 1997 caused a dramatic increase in school
funding for 30 poor, urban school districts in New Jersey. This ruling provides a
unique natural experiment with which to examine the effect of increased resources
on student achievement. The policy has several nice features from a researcher’s per-
spective. The ruling was unexpected and the change sudden; schools were wrapping
up the 1996-97 school year when the court released the decision and the additional
money was in place for the start of the 1997-98 school year. The change in funding
was large, averaging over $1000 per pupil and increasing the regular education bud-
get by about 10% for affected districts. Finally, the change affected only 30 school
districts, leaving the statutory school finance system in place for all other districts
and creating a natural comparison group.
In 2002, the New York Times Editorial page stated that the Abbott case “may be
the most significant education case since the Supreme Court’s desegregation ruling
nearly 50 years ago” (The New York Times, February 9, 2002). While this may
be true, there has been little research into the effects of the Abbott reforms.1 The
1There is a body of research about the effects of the “high-quality” universal preschool that was mandated for
Abbott districts in a subsequent ruling. See Frede, Jung, Barnett, Lamy, and Figueras (2007) and Lamy et al.
(2005). These papers show increased achievement for the Abbott students but I have not seen a comparison between
67
68
Abbott rulings speak of the need to “reduce the disparity in outcomes by reducing
the disparity in inputs.” The 1997 decision dramatically increased funding but there
is no comprehensive evaluation of the effect on student outcomes. In fact, because
of series breaks in the elementary and middle school assessments in New Jersey, it’s
not clear that the state has the data required to test whether the Abbott reforms
have had an effect. I use the publicly available, but imperfect, district-level data and
restricted student-level data to examine the effects of the policy on the one exam that
spans the policy change. I supplement this analysis with data on other outcomes at
the district level and trends on the state and National Assessment of Educational
Progress (NAEP) tests in earlier grades.
There is consensus in the economics of education literature that academic achieve-
ment matters for lifetime earnings and adult success (Hanushek, 2003). Urban schools
continue to struggle in matching the achievement levels seen in suburban schools and
increased funding continues to be a remedy directed to failing schools. One unre-
solved question is how to use that funding to improve the achievement of students
in poor and urban schools. Hanushek (1996, 2003) surveys the literature through
1994 on expenditures and student performance, finding that a large majority of the
serious studies find no statistically significant effect of school expenditures on stu-
dent achievement, and, of those finding significant effects, a sizable portion are of
the “wrong” sign. Hanushek also notes that other studies find significant differences
among teachers and that teachers impact the performance of students, but there is
no reliable link between school spending and the quality or output of teachers. He
concludes that resources have not been shown to be a useful policy instrument in
improving student achievement. Krueger (2003) criticized Hanushek’s meta-analysis
the Abbott districts and other districts. These papers do support the consensus in the literature that high-quality
early education is of great value in improving the education of needy students.
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and argues that the evidence on class size reductions in particular has shown consis-
tent positive effects. He used the results from Project STAR, a class size reduction
experiment, to calculate the lifetime earnings effect of small class sizes in early grades
and performs a cost-benefit analysis. He concludes that even at a cost of around
$7000 per student, class size reductions pay off in lifetime earnings and notes that
there are other private and societal benefits that are not captured by this estimate.
Most of the literature, including many of the studies Hanushek reviews, are studies
of aggregate resources in a state or locality, not direct evidence on the effect of
resources in the most needy schools. Studies of specific programs do suggest that
particular expenditures can improve performance. Ferguson (1998) summarizes the
research on programs or choices within schools that potentially affect the test score
gap between black and white students. He reports that there is a consensus that
early-education interventions, such as Head Start, the Perry Preschool experiment
and the Child-Parent Center, increase achievement and IQ scores for participant
students. These measured gains are large, ranging from one-third to one standard
deviation, but the literature is mixed on whether these gains are sustained over
time. Research on instructional interventions and class size reductions report gains
of similar magnitude, with larger effects for minority children. Brooks-Gunn (2003)
reviews the literature on early-childhood interventions and also concludes that high-
quality interventions increase achievement particularly for poor children and that
the effects, while diminishing, do persist through childhood and later schooling. A
remaining question is whether the effects of these programs justify their high costs.
Although there is a long and active literature on resources and schools, questions
remain unanswered. There are individual and societal benefits to higher educational
achievement. Money can matter in increasing achievement, but not all expenditure
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changes lead to educational improvements. The Abbott case gives an opportunity
to see what school districts do when given new resources and free reign in spending
choices. The Abbott case was not a test of a carefully controlled program but instead
an opportunity for the various Abbott districts to spend the money where they
thought it was needed. News reports from the first year of the program described
districts and schools that bought books for classrooms that were lacking them and
hired teachers aides to help struggling students (Newman, March 29, 1998; Rhor,
December 25, 1998). These types of expenditures seem likely to add to the school
experience of the treated students, and measuring the impact of these choices would
be valuable to policy makers and school officials. As I will discuss later, subsequent
Abbott rulings dramatically reduced districts’ discretion over spending.
While the natural experiment created by this ruling should be ideal for investi-
gating the effects of money on achievement, New Jersey’s lack of attention to the
quality and consistency of their school data makes a comprehensive analysis chal-
lenging. New Jersey instituted annual statewide assessments in the early 1980s in
elementary, middle and high school. Through the early 1990s districts used different
nationally available basic skills tests. The statewide elementary assessment did not
begin until 1999, making a before-after comparison impossible.2 Eighth grade stu-
dents have been assessed since the early 1990s, but two separate and very different
exams were in place before and after the reform and there was no overlap period that
might allow for norming across the two test regimes. The high school assessment,
given in 11th grade, did span the policy change and covers several years in each
period; I use this assessment to evaluate the Abbott reform.3
The state has recently highlighted improved achievement in fourth grade assess-
2District-level results for the earlier 4th grade assessments are available on paper in the state archives in Trenton.
I plan to obtain these data in the coming months.
3See http://www.nj.gov/education/assessment/history.shtml for an overview of assessment testing in New Jersey.
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ments in Abbott schools, but evidence of improvement in higher grades is notably
lacking (MacInnes, 2005)4. Indeed, 11th grade may be the least likely place to find
effects on achievement. If there is a cumulative effect of schooling, for example if the
skills tested on the 11th grade test build upon skills learned in each previous year,
the Abbott students who are exposed to the funding increase in high school will
have only a few years under the high-spending regime and will have obtained most
of their schooling with lower funding. Many of the students who could benefit from
extra resources may have already dropped out by high school. For the students who
have left the system, this policy is unlikely to draw them back, but it might prevent
students in later cohorts from dropping out. If the students who are deterred from
dropping out are at the lower end of the achievement distribution, this would tend
to lower average scores after the policy, working against measuring any achievement
improvement for the students who would have been in school under either policy.
I use publicly available district-level and restricted student-level data for the 11th
grade assessments. Using the district-level averages on the 1994-2001 High School
Proficiency Test, I find a statistically significant positive effect of about one-seventh
of a standard deviation on math scores and small and insignificant effects on reading
achievement. Using the student-level data to examine these effects more closely, I
find large and statistically significant improvements in achievement exclusively for
black and hispanic students in the Abbott districts, on the order of one-fifth to one-
quarter of a standard deviation. These groups of students consistently score one
standard deviation below their white classmates, so these are particularly important
gains, reducing the gap that remains after controlling for other characteristics by
nearly one-half. In all likelihood this measured effect averages successful programs
4NJDOE officials cite a narrowing gap in pass rates between Abbott and non-Abbott districts for the fourth grade
assessment, but the data start in 1999 and it is unclear whether the convergence is coming from better performance
by Abbotts or weaker performance by non-Abbotts.
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and unsuccessful ones. Better data and planning from the NJDOE would allow for
a more comprehensive analysis and the identification of which specific programs or
expenditures have substantial positive effects.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the
Abbott case and the expected effects on student achievement. Section 3.3 describes
my data and the empirical approach. Section 3.4 presents my empirical results and
Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The Abbott Case and School Finance in New Jersey
Until 1976, schools in New Jersey were financed solely through local property
taxes. As in many states, this led to large disparities in funding levels depending
on local wealth, and spurred a series of litigation aimed at increasing funding to
low-wealth districts. The 1970 Robinson v. Cahill lawsuit was the precursor of
the Abbott case and it challenged the disproportionately high tax burden required
for urban districts to provide the “thorough and efficient education” mandated by
the state constitution. The court agreed with the urban districts, leading to a new
funding formula to be supported by a state income tax which was instituted in 1976.
The Abbott v. Burke case, first filed in 1981, argued that the new state financing
plan failed to remedy the funding disparity, and that students in the four urban
districts originally named in the case were still not receiving an adequate education.
In 1985, the court found in the students’ favor, noting that wealthy districts spent
40% more than poorer districts; the court also expanded the districts covered by the
suit to a group of 28 poor urban school districts, which are now known as the Abbott
Districts.5
5Two additional Abbott districts, Neptune and Pemberton, were added in 1998 and one, Salem City, in 2004,
bringing the current total to 31.
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3.2.1 The Abbott IV Ruling Increased Funding to Abbott Districts
The court found in Abbott IV (1997) that the funding levels set in CEIFA were
chosen arbitrarily and did not reflect the cost of providing a thorough education.
The state had failed to significantly reduce the funding disparity through the mid-
1990s, so the court ordered in this ruling that the state fund the Abbott districts at
the level of the wealthiest districts in the state. The rationale behind this decision
was that the wealthy districts were successfully educating their students, so in the
absence of concrete figures for the cost of a “thorough and efficient” education, the
expenditures of the wealthy districts were the only available benchmark.6
The money that the state must provide to bridge the gap between an Abbott dis-
trict’s regular education budget and the average spending of the wealthiest districts
is called “parity aid.” In addition to this parity aid, poor schools in general and
the Abbotts specifically get significant additional funding from the state based on
the characteristics of the local student population. The parity aid is the portion of
funding that can potentially be thought of as exogenous. The state had successfully
held off the court mandate for more than 15 years, and while funding to Abbotts
began to increase in 1992, the funding changes starting in 1997-98 were dramatically
larger.
Figure 3.1 shows the money driven by the policy. The initial funding increase is
nearly $1000 per pupil on average and the amount increases to about $1500 per pupil
over the next few years. This is a significant budget increase for affected districts,
representing roughly 10% of mean total expenditures per pupil in New Jersey and
in the Abbott districts. There is significant variation among Abbott districts in the
amount received, with a few districts receiving no parity funding and one district
6For more background on the Abbott case and the New Jersey education finance system see the first chapter of this
dissertation and the Abbott history on the Education Law Center website at http://www.edlawcenter.org/index.htm.
74
receiving $1700 per pupil in the first year of the policy. Abbott school districts receive
the added funds and decide how to distribute the money throughout the district. In
principle, the funds could be targeted very narrowly within districts so only specific
students are affected.
3.2.2 Did the Policy Affect Actual Expenditures?
In the first chapter of this dissertation, examining the expenditure effects of this
reform, I show that much of the funding increase is spent in schools and in particular
is spent on items that could be expected to increase student performance. Table
3.1 summarizes the effects of the reform on expenditures in the Abbott districts.
The comparison group used in this analysis and throughout this paper, described in
section 3.3.2, contains other poor districts that are most like the Abbott districts.
The numbers in this table estimate the effect of $1 of state aid on the listed expen-
diture category where the Abbott policy is used as an instrument for state aid. The
estimate in row 1 says that for a dollar increase in state aid, school expenditures
increase by 70 cents. Current K-12 expenditures increase by an even larger amount,
about 85 cents per dollar of state aid. As shown in rows 3 and 4, the increased funds
go largely to Instructional and Support Services Expenditures.
These expenditures are focused on hiring more teachers and student support staff.
The largest numbers of teachers are hired into the elementary grades, reflecting a
stated focus on the early grades by the state and the Abbott districts. The Ab-
bott districts hired one extra elementary school teacher per 100 students and showed
significant increases in the numbers of high school nurses and social workers. Ab-
bott districts also showed significant increases in hiring of teachers of nonacademic
subjects in high school such as art, music and physical education.
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3.2.3 Expected Effects of Additional Spending
There are several potential avenues through which the added funds might affect
student outcomes. Several types of expenditures affect the classroom environment
directly, such as books and other educational materials, hiring or retaining teachers
and aides, and expansion or improvement of course offerings. Increasing classroom
resources through any of these channels could improve student achievement directly
by affecting the amount of academic material students learn. These seem to be the
main expenditures that increased with the policy. The Abbott districts did hire more
teachers. The early news articles reported that districts hired in various categories
and bought textbooks and other instructional supplies (Newman, March 29, 1998;
Rhor, December 25, 1998).
Other uses affect the school but not necessarily the classroom; these include spend-
ing on facilities, administration, and internal data collection and use. I find little
evidence of increased spending in these categories. Some expenditures, like expanded
student supports including health care and meals and expanded extra-curricular ac-
tivities, affect the students directly but outside the classroom. This last set of ex-
penditures is perhaps most likely to affect the composition of the 11th grade class
by affecting who drops out and it is also a category on which the Abbott districts
were spending money.
There are at least two reasons why effects might also have a time dimension.
One is that the effect on the student is cumulative and the other is that the district
learns how to use the money over time or has some lag before it can implement
new spending or policies. The evolving effect could be nonlinear; money at different
ages or grades might have different effects or part of a district’s learning process
might be learning how to divert this money for other purposes. If districts have
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clear unmet needs at the time of the policy change, such as unfilled teaching slots or
necessary supplies, the funding may have a short run effect as these needs are filled.
In the longer term, districts may or may not alter spending patterns to the optimal
uses. Goertz and Natriello (1999) report, looking at previous funding changes in
New Jersey, remarkably little adjustment to spending patterns. They show that
districts tend to increase spending proportionally across all uses, but do not seem to
reoptimize.
With enough data, we could get at the time pattern of these effects and the
interactions of the effects with grade level. With only one test score, the time effect
means that later cohorts of students get more years of the Abbott “treatment.” If
there is indeed a cumulative effect, the effects should get stronger with more years
of the policy. In other words, students who received more years of the parity aid
treatment should show larger effects than students with only one year under the
policy.
Newspaper articles during the 1997-98 school year reported on how some Abbott
districts used the parity aid in the first year. An article about one Abbott district,
Perth Amboy, describes that teacher aides were added to large classes, books and
other instructional materials were purchased for all classrooms, teachers were paid to
conduct intensive after-school remediation classes, and the district hired attendance
officers to reduce high absenteeism in particular schools (Newman, March 29, 1998).
These reports suggest that, at least in the first year, districts were filling existing
immediate needs.
The news reports and my results imply that districts were spending the added
money in classrooms, but not exclusively on academic subjects. My expenditure
results cannot differentiate among spending at different grade levels within a district,
77
so I cannot predict the expected results for the high school tests for which I have
data. The following section describes the data and strategy I use to examine the
effects empirically.
3.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
3.3.1 Data
State assessment testing began in New Jersey in the early 1980s with one as-
sessment in the elementary years, one in middle school and one in high school, but
the tests changed frequently. The assessments at all levels were completely over-
hauled beginning in 1998 to reflect the new Core Curriculum Standards that were
introduced in 1996. In this paper I focus on student performance on the 11th grade
state assessment test (the HSPT) because this is the only test that spans the policy
change7; testing using the HSPT began in 1991 and continued through 2000. The
state reports the average scale score and fraction of students in each district who pass
each state assessment in the annual school report card data. An electronic version
of these data is available starting with the 1997-98 school year.8 I extend the 11th
grade assessment series back in time using paper copies of the results published by
the state in earlier years. I have these district-level scores for the tests given in 1993
to 2000, which gives me 5 pre-reform years and 3 post-reform years. I also obtained
restricted student-level results for this exam from the New Jersey Department of
Education. These data include individual-level demographic information that allows
me to determine whether the policy disproportionately affects different groups of
students, but several years of the pre-reform results are missing so I am left with
only 2 years of pre-reform data and 5 years total.
7The 11th grade assessment that I use is the High School Proficiency Test (HSPT). This was replaced in 2002 by
the High School Proficiency Assessment (HSPA), a measurably more difficult test.
8The full Report Card dataset includes state assessment results, enrollment, graduation and dropout rates and
other indicators of student achievement, as well as some summary data about teachers.
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The HSPT was given in October of each school year. Student performance on an
October exam is a test of their learning through the previous year, so I relate each
October test to the previous school year. This means that the October 1998 exam
is the first one for which Abbott districts had received the parity aid “treatment.”
For all other variables, data labeled 1998 refers to the 1997-98 school year.
3.3.2 Comparison Group
In the achievement analysis I use the same comparison group that I use in chapter
2. To reiterate the selection strategy, I flag districts that have values below the 10th
percentile of Abbott districts for percent of students eligible for free lunch, district
enrollment, or district unemployment rate, and above the 90th percentile for percent
white, district income per pupil, or equalized property value per pupil using the 1996
values for these variables. I exclude districts that have more than two flags. This
excludes one Abbott district, 28 of the other 51 districts in the three poorest state
SES categories, and all but one of the districts in the five wealthier categories leaving
an analysis sample of 29 Abbott districts and 23 comparison districts. Because my
empirical strategy uses district fixed effects, the coefficients of interest are identified
using within-district variation over time. The comparison group is used to identify
the year effects and the impact of the control variables. Alternate selection methods
both more and less formal or sophisticated, discussed in chapter 2, result in a very
similar sample so I present results based on one particularly straightforward method
here. The choice of the comparison group will only affect my estimates if the true
relationship between achievement and the control variables differs between the Ab-
bott and comparison groups. The results presented in the following sections are not
sensitive to the exclusion of various outlier districts.9
9Specifically I separately exclude Hoboken, the wealthiest and most successful Abbott district, and exclude all
“large” districts.
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3.3.3 Characteristics of Sample and Patterns in Outcome Variables
Table 3.2 presents means of key variables for Abbott districts and the selected
comparison group in 1997, the school year before the policy change. The first two
sets of variables show characteristics of the communities and schools, measured at the
district level. The Abbott districts are slightly poorer and have much lower property
wealth than the comparison districts. Enrollments are much higher on average in Ab-
bott districts, although this is driven by a handful of large cities. The characteristics
of students are fairly similar - Abbotts have more limited English proficient students
than the comparison districts but similar numbers of special education students and
similar attendance and student mobility rates. The Abbotts do slightly worse than
the comparison group on the cumulative promotion index (CPI), a measure of stu-
dent promotion (and implicitly retention) used here as an alternative to the dropout
rate which is highly inaccurate in these data.10
The next group of variables includes the main outcome variables at the district
level. The math scale score is the district average score on the math assessment.
The scale score is an overall score for each subject that combines scores on several
subsections and is scaled (or normed) to be comparable across different years of the
test. This ranges from 100-500, with 300 being the cutoff for proficiency. The math
proficiency rate is the fraction of tested students in the district who score above this
cutoff. More than a third of students in Abbott districts are not proficient in math or
reading. The comparison districts do better with only about 20 percent of students
failing to reach proficiency. The number of regular-education students tested for
each subject is also reported. This excludes special education and limited English
proficient students who are also excluded from the reported scores. Statistics for
10The reported dropout rate is 1.9 on average for both groups, a number that is not credible. More information
in the CPI is included in the data appendix.
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performance and participation on the SATs are also included. The Abbott districts
perform roughly one standard deviation below the comparison districts on all of the
achievement measures listed here.
The final panel shows the assessment scores and student demographics calculated
from the student-level assessment data. The micro data show much greater variation
in assessment scores than the district level aggregates, with student scores spanning
the full range of possible scores. The Abbott districts also have larger fractions of
students eligible for Title 1 funding, which is directed to students who are both low-
achieving and low-income. The patterns in these data and the interactions between
demographics and test scores are explored in figures 3.2 and 3.3.
Figure 3.2 shows the patterns in math and reading scores on the 11th grade
assessment for Abbott and comparison districts. These numbers are the raw averages
calculated from the student-level data. Note that there is no data point for 1996;
each other year from 1995-2000 is covered. On average, math scores rise over the
period and reading scores are flatter and decreasing in the last few years. The
differential patterns after 1997 are coming through increasing math scores for the
Abbott districts, while the reading scores are falling for the comparison group.
Figure 3.3 shows the same outcomes by student ethnicity and then by ethnicity
and Abbott status. Panel A of this figure highlights the large achievement gap
between white and minority students. Black students score more than 80 points lower
than white students and hispanic students do only slightly better than blacks. These
gaps are roughly one standard deviation of the distribution in the full sample. This
gap is in line with estimates of the achievement gap nationally. This panel also shows
that the post-policy increases in math scores are coming from black and hispanic
students. Panel B suggests that these achievement improvements are concentrated
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in the Abbott districts. Panel B also highlights that achievement gaps exist between
Abbott and non-Abbott students of the same race. This gap, at about 20 points, is
much smaller than the gap between white and minority students. The reading scores
are less dramatic, but also show significant achievement gaps and an uptick for black
and hispanic students in the years after the policy change.
These time patterns suggest that the Abbott policy had an effect on achievement
on the 11th grade assessment, at least for some subgroups. The following section
discusses the empirical strategy that will test whether these changes are statistically
significant and whether they can be attributed to the policy.
3.3.4 Estimation Strategy
The ideal assessment of the effect of additional spending on students would re-
quire longitudinal data by student with multiple assessments and information on the
school attended by each student for all years (including nontested years). With lon-
gitudinal data by student and tests at various grade levels, I could use student fixed
effects to control for unmeasurable factors like innate student ability and motivation
that are constant over time but impossible to measure and control for directly. Com-
prehensive data would also allow me to identify and control for teacher and school
effects. Even without multiple test scores for each student, longitudinal enrollment
information would allow me to more precisely define the amount of policy that each
student was exposed to. The theoretical model that underlies this strategy is that
individual student achievement at any grade is determined by the accumulated ef-
fects of school and family inputs over all previous years. This is the production
function model described in Todd and Wolpin (2003). The Abbott IV ruling creates
an exogenous increase in the school-based inputs available to the affected students.
This exogenous change allows me to identify the effect of increased school resources
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on student achievement. Todd and Wolpin (2003) lay out the important distinction
between identifying parameters of a production function for education and identi-
fying a policy effect that does not make clear the causal mechanisms driving the
effect. In my main analysis I am estimating a policy effect that combines the effects
of many different choices and programs in different school districts. The additional
analysis attempt to further examine what factors within districts might be driving
these changes.
The main shortcoming of the available data is that the state does not follow
students over time.11 Without longitudinal data by student it is impossible to control
for the unobserved student characteristics. This will not bias the estimate of the
effect of the policy unless the policy also alters the composition of the student body.
Ideally, even without longitudinal data, we would like to know if each student in the
cross section has switched schools or districts in the last year. This would allow us
to estimate whether there is a different effect for movers and stayers. In the actual
data, district level mobility is defined only as the number of students who leave or
enter during the year.
A second shortcoming of the actual data is that the full series of results is available
only for the district-level aggregates. The student-level data are missing three of the
pre-policy years. I first use the district-level data to take advantage of the longer
time series and then use the more detailed microdata to investigate whether the
effects differ across student characteristics.
To evaluate the effect of the policy on student test scores using the district-level
data, I estimate the following equation:
AverageScaleScorejt = α0 + βAbbott ∗ Post1997j + αj + εjt, (3.1)
11Longitudinal student-level data exist statewide in New Jersey starting in 2004. The districts with the best record
keeping might have them for some period of time before that date.
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where j indexes the district and t indexes years. The district fixed effects, αj, control
for stable differences between districts over time. Abbott*Post1997 is an indicator
variable for being in an Abbott district while the policy is in effect.
To tease out the time path of the effects I use two alternate specifications. The first
adds the term γY rOfAbbottFundingj, which is a linear trend for Abbott districts
that turns on with the policy change. Here β measures the immediate effect of the
Abbott funding policy on assessment scores and γ is a linear learning effect. The time
path could be more flexible. The second version adds separate indicator variables for
each year of the policy and for being an Abbott district affected by each year of the
policy, allowing for different effects for each year of the policy. For each specification
of the policy effect, I also estimate models that include the few district-level control
variables that are plausibly unaffected by the policy. The student-level version adds
demographic information (race, gender, and Title 1 status) about the student and
interactions of these variables with the policy indicator.
With the district-level data, several assumptions are necessary for this estimated
β to capture the true effect of the policy on achievement. First, student mobility and
the effects of mobility on test scores do not change as a result of the policy. Second,
the likelihood of dropping out conditional on ability or achievement is not changed
by the policy. Both of these assumptions deal with the composition of the tested
group. If the policy changes the ability distribution of students who are tested, any
measured effect could be the result of this composition change. To get at the causal
relationship between money and student achievement we want to measure the effect
on students who would have been tested under either regime. The student-level
data includes demographic information on each student that allow me to relax these
assumptions. In the specifications that use these more detailed data, the necessary
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assumption is that these variables fully control for any changes in composition.
3.4 Results
This section presents the empirical results. First I present the effects on the 11th
grade assessment at the district and student level and then look at other high school
outcomes and potential mediating variables. To get at the effects on earlier grades
I also present trends on the New Jersey assessments in fourth and eighth grade and
the state NAEP.
3.4.1 The Abbott Reform Increased Math Achievement
Table 3.3 presents results for the effect of the Abbott reform on 11th grade math
scale scores.12 Panel A shows the basic relationship between money and achievement
and highlights the mistake that observers make when looking at this policy from afar.
The OLS results in column 1 show a negative relationship between the policy and
achievement. This is the raw correlation that newspapers and critics of the reform
frequently highlight: the Abbott districts perform worse than the other districts,
even after receiving a large infusion of money. Column 2 adds district fixed effects
and is the weakest version of being careful about the counterfactual. Controlling
for the average performance of each district over the whole period, β is positive and
statistically significant. The policy improves math scores in the Abbott districts
by nearly six points. This is about fourteen percent of a standard deviation in the
district-level data. The post 1997 indicator shows that all districts score about seven
points higher on average after 1997.
Columns 3 and 4 present the two alternate specifications that tease out the timing
of the effects. Column 3 adds a linear trend interacted with the policy indicator.
12All standard errors are clustered at the district level to allow for correlation within district over time.
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This variable equals zero for all districts for the pre-policy years and equals one for
Abbott districts in 1998-99, the second year of the policy, and increases by one each
additional year. The Abbott*Post1997 indicator captures the immediate effect and
this time trend allows for an evolving effect over time. Abbott students in later
years receive a combination of these two effects, β and γ. This allows for the fact
that 11th grade Abbott-district students in 2000 received three years of schooling
under the new regime while students in 1997-98 only received one. The addition
of this time trend does reduce the size of β but the effect remains positive. γ, the
coefficient on the trend is positive, with a point estimate of 1.53, but statistically
insignificant. Over time, however, this effect accumulates so for students in 2000, the
total effect is β plus 2 times γ or 5.85, the same as the estimate of β in the previous
column. Because this trend is linear it only identifies whether the effect of the policy
is growing or shrinking over time. Column 4 breaks this linear trend into effects for
each year. The point estimate is biggest for the second year of the policy, although
the three coefficients are not statistically different from one another. The coefficient
on each Abbott*year indicator is interpreted as the difference between the average
score for Abbotts and the statewide average, controlling for each district’s overall
average through the district fixed effects. In 1998, Abbott districts score 2.9 points
higher than the comparison group, 8.7 points higher in 1999 and just under 6 points
higher in 2000. In this specification only the second year of the policy is significant,
but the year effects show statewide increases in math scores in the post-policy years.13
Panel B adds the district-level control variables that are unlikely to be affected
by the policy.14 These variables are district-level enrollment and enrollment squared
13An alternate version of this specification adds a statewide annual trend to control for the possibility that the
measured changes are coming from an overall trend in scores and are unrelated to the policy. The estimates on the
Abbott*year variables do not change significantly in this alternate specification.
14Table 3.8 examines the effects of the policy on potential mediating variables.
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to control for changes in district scale over the time period. District size does have a
small positive but diminishing effect; the net effect is positive at the average enroll-
ment for each group. The estimate of the effect of the policy is slightly smaller, but
is still nearly 5 points in column 5. Columns 6 and 7 add the timing variables and
the results are very similar to those in panel A. The policy has a small effect in the
first year, 2.3 points or less than one-tenth of a standard deviation, a much larger
and statistically significant effect of 7.8 points in the second year, and the effect falls
in the third year to 4.4 points.
Panel C presents the same regressions for the restricted set of years that matches
the data available at the student level. As described above, several years of the pre-
reform student-level data are unavailable. There are 5 years of data in the student-
level versions compared to 8 years in the unrestricted district-level regressions. For
the policy variables, the move to the restricted sample does not dramatically affect
the results. Comparing the estimates in Panel C to those in Panel B, the point
estimates change slightly but the qualitative story is similar. The effect of the policy
is slightly larger using the restricted sample.
Table 3.4 presents estimates for the remaining HSPT outcomes at the district level.
In this table I present results for the basic policy effect, using just the indicator for
being affected by the policy, and the results that break out each year separately. In
each case I present the results for the full sample and for the restricted sample; the
full sample is first in the odd numbered columns and the restricted sample follows
in the even columns. Panel A shows results for the fraction reaching proficiency on
the math exam. The pattern is the same as for the scale score, but the magnitudes
are slightly smaller with the largest estimate around five points as the dependent
variable is measured on a smaller range from 0 to 100. Panels B and C present
87
the corresponding results for the reading assessment. For reading, the effect of the
policy, shown in column 5 for the scale score and column 9 for proficiency, is positive
but statistically insignificant. On average, the policy seems to have little effect on
reading performance. The results in columns 7, 8, 11 and 12, which break out the
year effects, show that the effect is evolving over time. These results mirror the
trends seen in figure 3.2 where the performance of the comparison group deteriorates
in the later years and performance for the Abbotts increased somewhat. In contrast
to the math results, the reading results do show a growing, although statistically
insignificant, impact of the policy for Abbott districts. In all cases, the estimates of
policy effects are not significantly impacted by use of the restricted sample.
3.4.2 The Abbott Reform Increased Math and Reading Performance for Black and
Hispanic Students
Table 3.5 uses the student-level test scores to estimate the effect of the Abbott
reform and allows identification of differential effects for different groups of students.
I restrict the sample using the same criteria that the state uses for their published
reports. Only first-time 11th grade test takers are included, and special education
and limited English proficient students are excluded.15 The specifications included
here mimic those presented in table 3.4 for the aggregated data.16 Panel A presents
the math results. Looking at column 1, the effect of the Abbott policy on math
scores is about 5 points and statistically insignificant in this specification, but the
coefficients on the covariates highlight the disparities between different groups of stu-
dents. Black and hispanic students perform far worse than their white counterparts
on the math exam. Female students do worse than males on the math assessment.
Black girls perform significantly better than black boys but hispanic girls do worse
15Inclusion of these students and indicator variables for their status does not affect the main results. The perfor-
mance of the special education and LEP students is not differentially affected by the policy.
16In specifications with no control variables, the β estimates are nearly identical to those in tables 3.3 and 3.4.
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than hispanic boys.
Although the size of the policy effect is similar to that seen in the district-level
data, the time pattern is negative when using the micro data. The results in column
3 shows a 7 point gain in the first year of the policy and then a drop off in both
magnitude and significance in the 2nd and 3rd years of the policy. Again, these
effects are not significantly different from one another. In contrast, the overall trend
given by the year indicators shows monotonically increasing performance statewide.
The even numbered columns add interactions of the policy indicator with the
student-level demographics. In both cases β falls in size and significance and the
interactions of the policy with black and hispanic are quite large and statistically
significant at the 0.01 level. This pattern is consistent across the different specifi-
cations. The policy improves the scores of black and hispanic students by around
17 points on the math assessment. This is one-fifth of a standard deviation in the
math score and about one-quarter of the achievement gap between white and mi-
nority students highlighted in figure 3.3. It represents an even larger fraction of the
achievement gap after controlling for other characteristics. This impact is 40% of the
coefficient on race for black students and 60% of the coefficient for hispanic students.
Panel B repeats the same specifications for the reading scores. The demographic
variables show that the relationship between student characteristics and reading
achievement is similar to the relationship with math achievement with one exception.
Girls perform significantly better than boys on average on the reading exam while
boys do better on the math exam. The main effects of the policy, shown in the odd
columns for the various specifications, conform with the results from the district-level
data. There is a small and weak effect on reading scores, but the time path is positive
and contrasts with a negative trend statewide. When the policy is interacted with
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the demographic variables the coefficient on the main policy effect becomes more
negative but remains statistically insignificant and retains the positive time trend.
The individual level data does reveal that there is a positive effect of the policy for the
black and hispanic subgroups. The magnitude is about 12 points, which is smaller
than the effect on math scores, but represents about one-quarter of the pre-policy
gap between Abbott and non-Abbott achievement.17 For both races, it is about half
of the gap measured by the uninteracted coefficient on race.
3.4.3 Other District-Level Outcomes - Enrollment, Attendance, SATs
Although the HSPT is the only state exam that is consistent over the policy
change, there are available data for other indicators of student achievement. The
following two tables examine the effects on other variables at the district level that
may be outcomes of interest. These include SAT participation and achievement
which are hard to interpret as direct achievement measures because students elect to
take the exam, but provide some information about plans for college-going and the
performance of college-bound students. The second set of outcomes includes several
enrollment and retention measures.
Table 3.6 presents effects of the policy on participation and performance on the
SAT exams. Looking at the odd numbered columns, which use the policy dummy,
there is little effect of the policy on participation or average performance, but the
point estimates for all variables except the 75th percentile math score are negative.
The time pattern shows that the policy dummy is averaging positive and negative
effects in different years. The time pattern in participation and scores supports
the interpretation that increased participation is causing the lower scores. If new
17When the specification with year*treatment indicators is run on each race separately there is no evidence of an
increasing effect over time for black or hispanic students in reading or math. For white students, there does seem to
be some positive trend for reading.
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participants are coming from the lower part of the achievement distribution, they
would be expected to reduce average scores. Participation for Abbott districts is
highest, controlling for average participation through the district fixed effects, in
1998 and falls in 1999 and 2000. The average math SAT scores show the exact
opposite pattern. The 25th percentile math score shows the largest effect, -12.6
points or about one-third of a standard deviation, in 1998 when participation is the
highest, suggesting that greater numbers of low-scoring students are taking the test.
Table 3.7 presents the effect of the Abbott policy on other district level outcomes.
The first two outcomes examine whether the tested class is changing in size, both
measured in absolute terms as 11th grade enrollment and relative to each cohort’s
9th grade enrollment two years earlier. For 11th grade enrollment, the estimate in
column 1 suggests that 11th grade enrollment falls by about 46 students or 10%
of the Abbott average. This appears to be coming from a change in cohort size
as there is little effect on 11th grade enrollment as a fraction of lagged 9th grade
enrollment. Columns 3 and 4 show the effect on 11th grade enrollment as a fraction
of each cohort’s ninth grade enrollment. The estimate using the policy dummy is 0.8
percent, suggesting that the enrollment changes are occuring within each cohort; the
more flexible time effects show that there are overall declines for all districts. The
Abbotts show a postive, although statistically insignificant, trend indicating that
the within cohort effect of the Abbott policy on retention may be positive. Columns
5 and 6 give the effect on the cumulative promotion index, an alternative to the
dropout rate that uses enrollment data from all four high school grades to estimate
the likelihood that a ninth-grade student will graduate on time. The estimated effect
of 8.8 in column 5 is quite large, about 13% of the pre-policy average, and column 6
shows that this average effect is masking a more dramatic trend in the year effects.
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The effect on the CPI is growing for Abbott districts from about 5 points in the first
year of the policy to 14 in 2000, relative to statistically significant declines in the
promotion index for all districts in the sample. The effect on the attendance rate
is also positive and statistically significant, but small at less than one-third of one
percent and the year effects show that the effect for the Abbotts is only statistically
significant in the first year. Taken together, these results suggest that more enrolled
students are in school, both on a daily basis measured through attendance and in
the longer term measured through retention, but that enrollment overall has fallen
in Abbott districts.
3.4.4 Effects on Mediating Variables at the District Level
To examine the paths through which the Abbott policy affected student achieve-
ment, table 3.8 presents the effects of the policy on potential mediating variables
at the district level. These data are all reported by the school districts and pub-
lished by the NJDOE in the school district report cards. As in the previous tables,
two regressions are presented for each outcome variable. Columns 1 and 2 show the
results for average class size. The estimate using the policy indicator is -0.12 and
is statistically insignificant, implying that class size fell by a negligible amount for
Abbott districts. Column 2 shows that class sizes were falling for all districts, and
by an additional amount for the Abbotts. The implied effect of the policy is small
in this specification, but does increase over time. The results for the student-faculty
ratio in columns 3 and 4 are similar, but are larger than the effects on class size and
even larger as a fraction of the baseline level. The class size and student-faculty ratio
results both show that these ratios were improving for the comparison group as well
as the Abbotts over this period. The point estimates imply that by 2000, class size
decreased by 1 student for all districts and 1.3 for the Abbotts while the student-
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faculty ratio fell by 0.9 for the comparison group and 1.73 for the Abbotts. The effect
on the student-administrator ratio are larger in point estimates, and are about 5%
of the baseline of about 300 students per adminstrator. In contrast to the pattern
for class size and student-faculty ratios where the effects for Abbotts reinforce the
overall trend given by the year indicators, the effects on the student-administrator
ratio in Abbott districts offset an increasing ratio for all districts. The comparison
districts show a sizeable increase in the student-administrator ratio and the effect
grows over the time period.
The remaining outcomes in columns 7 to 12 are district-level measures of student
characteristics. Student mobility is reported as the number of students transitioning
in or out of a district during the school year and the rate is calculated by dividing
mobility by total district enrollment. Mobility is increasing for Abbott districts
through the policy years, but the effect is small and not statistically significant. The
special education rate shows a positive but statistically insignificant effect when the
policy is estimated using the policy dummy, but the effect is smaller and decreasing
when measured by year. The percent limited English proficient is relatively flat, with
no significant change using either specification.
Looking at the results in table 3.8, the main effects seem to be decreases in the
student-faculty and student-administrator rates and a modest decrease in class size.
The class size change is relatively small when compared to the class size interventions
reviewed by Krueger (2003). It is important to note that these results are at the
district level, so may not accurately reflect changes at the high school level. It is
possible (although unlikely) that the class size reduction in tenth grade was large
enough to create the large achievement gains described above.
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3.4.5 Trends in Earlier Grades
While these high school results are promising, the news coverage and my previous
work show that the bulk of the expenditures went to the elementary grades. Because
there is no consistent elementary school test until 1999, I cannot assess the impact
of the policy on achievement in early grades. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show the trends in
proficiency rates for the 4th grade exam that began in 1998-99. The general upward
trend for both groups in both subjects is explained by the fact that this was a new
exam introduced to test proficiency relative to the new curriculum standards. The
content and scoring of the test was likely adjusted over the period to better align
with the state’s definition of proficiency and over time schools and teachers learned
how to prepare for this assessment.18 The Abbott districts do seem to be closing
the gap in the math assessment as the gap falls from 13 percentage points in 1999
to 5.7 points in 2004, but the change is not as dramatic as the overall trend. The
differential trend in the reading exam is less clear, although the gap is smaller in
2004 than in 1999, dropping from 13.5 to 5 percentage points.
Figures 3.6 and 3.7 show the trends for the eighth grade assessment that began
in 1999. As with the 4th grade test, the overall trends overwhelm any change in
the gap between Abbott and non-Abbott districts. The general trend is negative for
both subjects. The gap in math scores falls from 11.6 to 5.6 percentage points from
1999 to 2004 and the gap in reading scores falls from 9 to 7.
Table 3.9 shows the trends in aggregate New Jersey NAEP scores since 1992. The
data presented here are average scale scores for the 4th grade math and reading
assessments and the 8th grade math assessment.19 Where results are missing for a
18This is often criticized as “teaching to the test” but this is the goal of assessments aligned with curriculum
standards. The assessment is meant to accurately test the material the state has stated that students should learn.
198th grade reading is excluded because there are no data for the pre-policy years.
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test in a given year it is because that test was not given in that year or New Jersey did
not meet the reporting requirements for that assessment. The scores cannot be split
into Abbott and non-Abbott districts, but the school location designation of “Central
City” provides a proxy for Abbott districts while “Urban Fringe” covers all other
districts in New Jersey. The 4th grade scores show the gap between performance
in cities and that in the other areas decreasing markedly over the time period. The
gaps between black and white students and hispanic and white students show similar
decreases over the time period. Although these data on achievement in the earlier
grades are not ideal, they suggest that the Abbott districts are catching up to the
achievement level of other districts in New Jersey.
3.5 Discussion and Conclusions
The results presented in the previous section show that there is a significant posi-
tive impact of the Abbott policy on 11th grade achievement in the Abbott districts.
In the aggregate data, the results are fairly modest, with an impact of at most 5
points. This average effect for all Abbott students obscures the fact the improve-
ment is much more dramatic for the groups of students who most need improvement.
Using student-level data I show that there are significant improvements for minority
students in both math and reading. The impact is roughly one-fifth of a standard
deviation in test scores and one-quarter of the achievement gap between white and
minority students without considering Abbott status. These effects are quite large.
My estimates of 0.2-0.25 standard deviations of math and reading scores are similar
in size to the 0.2 that Krueger (2003) uses as an estimate of the effect of four years
of reduced class size based on the results of Project STAR. The measured effect here
is almost surely an average of large positive effects in some districts and zero (or
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negative) effects in other districts. Better data about the specific expenditures for
each district would allow for identification of the successful policies.
The effects on the HSPT are about half the size of the 0.5 standard deviation
effects of the Success For All program on elementary school reading (Ferguson, 1998).
Because the elementary and middle school assessments began in the 1998-99 school
year and we have no measure of the pre-policy gap, I cannot measure the effect of the
policy on those grade levels. The trends in the assessment results are not strong or
conclusive, but do offer supporting evidence that the Abbott districts are improving
relative to the comparison group.
3.5.1 Are the Effects Too Large?
The effects described here are quite large, given that they are measured within
the first few years of the policy and in high school where we might expect little
effect. One might question whether these effects are too large. My related work
on how the Abbott money was spent showed that districts hired more teachers and
instructional support staff, and teachers in Abbott districts confirm that this was the
most immediate change. Newspaper articles also reported spending on books and
for alleviating classroom crowding. The retention and attendance results together
suggest that students are spending more time in high school. If this time in school
is productive, this could explain the achievement impact even without any specific
instructional intervention.
Although the class size change seen for Abbotts is too small to have created these
large achievement effects, this modest reduction in class size is combined with in-
creased individual instruction and remedial help by teacher aides targeted to the
students. It is possible that these changes together could have large effects, par-
ticularly when targeted to students in need of assistance. A cynical interpretation
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is that the districts were focusing only on students that could make a large gain,
perhaps those closest to the pass/fail threshold. The evidence here does not differen-
tiate between actual knowledge gains by the affected students and short-term gains
from specific test preparation, so I cannot judge whether these effects are likely to
persist for the individual students. While the HSPT is a high-stakes test from the
student perspective because it is a graduation requirement, there was no district-level
accountability policy in place during my sample period so there is no district-level
incentive to inflate scores artificially.
It is notable that the policy seems to affect only minority students. This is con-
sistent with previous research that has shown that effects are particularly strong for
poor and minority students. This is true of the early childhood interventions sur-
veyed by Brooks-Gunn (2003) and the class size interventions described by Krueger
(2003).
3.5.2 Why Doesn’t the Effect Increase Over Time?
When the timing effect is split using year indicators instead of the linear trend,
the effects are in most cases flat or even diminishing. If districts were learning how
to use the money more effectively or students were benefiting from a cumulative
positive effect over several years of increased funding, we would expect the impact to
be increasing over time. One explanation is that the districts learned how to divert
the resources away from educational purposes over time. Another is that education
expenditures at the high school level do not have a cumulative effect, either because
there is a limit to what students can learn or because there is a limit on what school
districts know how to change. Perhaps alleviating the clear needs in the Abbott
schools by fully staffing classrooms and making sure that all students have books
caused a 20 point increase for affected students, but districts did not make any
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changes beyond that.
Another explanation, cited by officials in Abbott districts, is that the state added
mandates in the years after 1998 for how the money was to be spent. The two main
mandates added in 1998 were universal preschool and comprehensive school reform
for Abbott districts. These were to be in effect by the 2000-01 school year but some
districts began immediately; these programs were reportedly fully funded over and
above the parity aid. Even with full funding, the districts may have shifted attention
and possibly resources to the lower grades and away from high schools. The court’s
attention to early grades is attributed to the fact that there is a body of evidence
about successful interventions at early grades but no comparable evidence about
higher grades. The court did not intend for districts to ignore older students, but
the lack of guidance about these grades may have had that result. The implication
in this story is that the district’s unconstrained choices in the first years were useful
but that funds were diverted away from the high school grades in later years. In
effect, all students covered in the HSPT sample would have received the additional
funding for one year but each cohort would have received it in a different grade. The
oldest affected students, who took the HSPT in October 1998 would have had the
added funding in 10th grade. The next cohort would have had the added funding in
the same calendar year but that would be their 9th grade year.
An implementation study of the comprehensive school reform supports the idea
that Abbott districts diverted money and attention to elementary schools to the
detriment of other schools in the districts. Erlichson (2005) describes the implemen-
tation and eventual abandonment of comprehensive school reform (CSR) for Abbott
elementary schools. Different schools chose different CSR packages, including well-
known programs such as Success for All and Community for Learning. These pack-
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ages each prescribe their own curricula and associated staffing levels. For explaining
the effect of this reform on high schools, one important detail is that the CSR im-
plementation included the use of school-based budgets for the elementary schools.
While the NJDOE provided significant additional funding to support this reform, the
affected schools chose CSR models and created their budgets “without district inter-
ference” and without considering district-wide needs and constraints. These budgets
were submitted to and approved by the NJDOE based on the requirements of each
CSR package. Erlichson (2005) reports that larger Abbott districts had as many
as seven different CSR models under implementation at once. It is easy to imagine
that this would cause a drain on district resources, both financial and in terms of
leadership. The first cohort of schools implemented CSR for the 1998-99 school year,
after one year of unrestricted parity aid money for Abbotts, and additional schools
started CSR in the following two years. The Abbott preschool program, leading
toward universal preschool for all 3- and 4-year olds in Abbott districts began in the
1999-00 school year, further diverting attention away from secondary schools (Lamy,
Frede, Seplocha, Strasser, Jambunathan, Junker, and Wolock, 2005).
3.5.3 Are the Effects Worth the Money Spent?
Compared to other estimates in the literature, these effects come quite cheaply at
less than $1500 per student per year. Krueger (2003) estimates that the cost of the
class size reduction in the Project STAR experiment was $3500 per pupil per year,
which is substantially larger than the $1000-1500 per pupil per year of parity aid. At
that cost, he estimates that 0.1 standard deviation is the critical effect size for the
Project STAR program to break even, assuming costs of just over $7000 for two years
of schooling in a small class and a lifetime earnings boost of 8% from a one standard
deviation increase in math or reading achievement in the elementary grades. He
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argues the earnings effect would be larger if the achievement gain is measured later
in school. These effects are only the private benefit and the aggregate social benefits
are likely to be positive as well.
3.5.4 Does Money Matter and What Do We Learn from Abbott?
The evidence I present in this paper, although not ideal, clearly suggests that
some students have made dramatic improvements in achievement in a short time.
Combined with the consensus that interventions can have a big effect on achievement
in early grades (Krueger, 2003; Brooks-Gunn, 2003; Ferguson, 1998) it is clear that
money does matter for achievement. My results suggest that targeted funds can
have a big impact even in high school. The remaining question is which policies and
programs are worth supporting given limited budgets. To answer this, researchers
need to look more closely at specific policies and interventions. Within each case
there are successes and failures, but the large meta-analyses tend to average these
effects and find zero or small effects on net. Ideally researchers will continue to
run randomized, controlled experiments in education so we can be confident of the
parameters being manipulated and the mechanisms behind the effects.
Researchers can still learn from non-experimental cases, but we need to use all
the data available to look within policies to learn what pieces are actually working.
This paper attempts to do this in the Abbott case, but the lack of appropriate data
makes it impossible to make conclusions about specific expenditures. The first lesson
from the Abbott reform is that if a state wants to measure the achievement results
of a policy convincingly and cleanly, it must keep a consistent testing regime in the
years around the policy change.
The second lesson is that it is important to think about the broader effects of
each policy. In the Abbott case, the attention to elementary grades in the later
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court rulings had the unintended effect of diverting attention and resources from
secondary grades. In particular, the implementation of school-level reforms without
regard to the district- and state-level budget constraint seems to have been a main
factor in derailing the gains in high schools.
This particular policy is not sustainable, both because of the large financial cost
and because it sets all other districts in the state against the Abbott districts in the
allocation of state resources. Indeed, New Jersey has passed a new school finance
law that attempts to remove the Abbott designation; the NJ Supreme Court has
yet to rule on the constitutionality of the new law. Although the state failed to set
up a credible evaluation when the policy began, it could still learn from the Abbott
policy by using internal data to identify which districts and schools were successful
and why. New Jersey and other states could learn from the Abbott experience and
focus resources on the more successful programs and expenditures.
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3.7 Tables
Table 3.1: Effects of Abbott Policy on Education Expenditures
Instrumental Variable Specifications - Y=Expenditures per pupil
Model: Exp per pupil = α + βState Aid per pupil (IV) + γDistrict FE + δYear FE + ε
Estimate Std Error
(1) Total Expenditures 0.697 (0.110)**
Expenditure Subcategories
(2) Current K-12 Expenditures 0.857 (0.097)**
(3) Instructional Expenditures 0.483 (0.064)**
(4) Support Services Exp 0.365 (0.041)**
(5) Other Current Expenditures 0.011 (0.012)
(6) Non-K-12 Expenditures -0.004 (0.010)
(7) Capital Outlays -0.128 (0.076)
Subcategories of Instructional or 
Support Services Expenditures
(8) Instructional Salaries 0.207 (0.042)**
(9) Instructional Support 0.053 (0.009)**
(10) Pupil Support 0.065 (0.010)**
(11) Admin Support 0.006 (0.004)
(12) Operations and Maintenance Support 0.025 (0.011)*
(13) Transportation Support -0.003 (0.006)
Observations 676
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the district level).
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.5: Effect of Abbott Policy on 11th Grade Assessments: Student-level Data
Effect of Policy on Individual Level Scale Scores
All Columns include District Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Policy Dummy 5.78 -5.33 1.58 -3.56
(3.54) (4.83) (2.62) (3.76)
Post 1997 Dummy 2.89 2.98 -1.79 -1.73
(1.63)+ (1.66)+ (1.62) (1.60)
Abbott and Year=1998 7.18 -4.17 -0.37 -5.31
(3.14)* (4.38) (2.75) (4.05)
Abbott and Year=1999 6.73 -4.42 2.00 -2.98
(3.39)+ (4.20) (2.27) (3.30)
Abbott and Year=2000 3.36 -7.09 2.87 -1.85
(5.91) (6.74) (4.98) (5.39)
Year = 1997 2.16 1.73 1.35 1.08
(2.94) (3.37) (1.99) (2.23)
Year = 1998 3.67 3.24 3.57 3.32
(2.53) (2.73) (2.38) (2.50)
Year = 1999 3.68 3.83 -2.39 -2.30
(2.36) (2.49) (2.00) (2.05)
Year = 2000 4.62 4.49 -4.39 -4.44
(2.97) (3.14) (2.64) (2.65)
Title 1 -52.01 -53.85 -52.52 -54.00 -44.20 -42.77 -45.08 -43.11
(16.23)** (14.22)** (16.01)** (13.99)** (12.61)** (11.05)** (12.34)** (10.91)**
Female -9.36 -9.46 -9.37 -9.46 3.62 4.70 3.61 4.69
(1.03)** (1.20)** (1.02)** (1.20)** (1.00)** (1.05)** (1.00)** (1.06)**
Black -35.96 -43.36 -35.96 -43.30 -23.64 -28.40 -23.64 -28.24
(8.15)** (6.59)** (8.18)** (6.62)** (6.11)** (5.07)** (6.14)** (5.11)**
Hispanic -20.89 -27.99 -20.97 -27.96 -17.00 -22.35 -17.05 -22.29
(5.62)** (4.68)** (5.66)** (4.70)** (4.69)** (4.04)** (4.76)** (4.06)**
Female*Black 8.22 7.42 8.26 7.45 5.60 5.39 5.67 5.47
(1.75)** (2.41)** (1.74)** (2.39)** (1.13)** (1.62)** (1.12)** (1.61)**
Female*Hispanic -2.96 -2.95 -2.92 -2.94 -4.14 -3.22 -4.10 -3.17
(1.34)* (2.14) (1.34)* (2.13) (1.12)** (1.94) (1.12)** (1.95)
Title 1 * Treatment 6.19 5.81 -2.29 -3.40
(8.70) (8.69) (6.98) (6.69)
Female *Treatment 0.51 0.49 -2.73 -2.71
(2.00) (1.99) (2.29) (2.27)
Black*Treatment 18.69 18.59 11.86 11.44
(5.68)** (5.63)** (4.67)* (4.71)*
Hispanic*Treatment 17.07 16.90 12.57 12.31
(5.07)** (4.97)** (4.53)** (4.55)**
Female*Black*Treatment 0.95 0.95 0.38 0.37
(3.22) (3.18) (2.54) (2.51)
Female*Hispanic*Treatment -0.33 -0.30 -1.82 -1.86
(3.72) (3.70) (3.03) (2.99)
Constant 355.87 359.97 354.82 359.08 335.45 337.32 334.83 336.73
(4.35)** (3.88)** (4.62)** (4.01)** (3.39)** (3.04)** (3.50)** (3.13)**
Observations 70352 70352 70352 70352 70325 70325 70325 70325
R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the district level
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The data sources and definitions of main variables are described in more detail in
this section.
3.8.1 National Center for Education Statistics Data
Enrollment All enrollment figures are for October 15th of the given school year.
These data are downloaded from the Common Core of Data website at
http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/index.asp.
Cumulative Promotion Index (CPI) The CPI is an alternative measure for a gradu-
ation rate. It uses two years of consecutive data for all high school grades to estimate
the probability that a student entering 9th grade will graduate in four years with a
diploma. This measure was developed by Christopher Swanson at the Urban Insti-
tute. For more information on the CPI see http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=410843.
My CPI measure is calculated from annual enrollment data downloaded from
NCES. The formula appears below.
CPI = (10thGrEnrollt/9thGrEnrollt−1)* (11thGrEnrollt/10thGrEnrollt−1)*
(12thGrEnrollt)/11thGrEnrollt−1)*(Diplomast/12thGrEnrollt−1)
3.8.2 New Jersey Department of Education Data
School Report Card The School Report Cards are published annually by the NJ-
DOE and include, among other variables, school-level data on enrollment, staffing,
expenditures, and results on student assessments. A longitudinal historical file covers
the school years 1994-95 to 2001-02. These files do not, however, include data on all
items back to 1995, as many items were only collected in later years. The items used
in this paper are defined below.
116
These data are found at http://education.state.nj.us/rc/.
Average class size is total enrollment divided by the number of classrooms for
elementary school and by the number of English classes for secondary schools.
Limited English proficient (LEP) is the number of students in LEP programs
divided by total enrollment.
Student mobility rate is the number of students who left or entered the district
during the school year (but after the Oct 15 enrollment count) divided by total
enrollment.
The SAT data are reported to New Jersey by the College Board. The NJDOE
data report card documentation does not include information on how the participa-
tion rates are calculated.
Attendance rate is the average percent of students in attendance each day. It
is the sum over the school year of all students present each day divided by total
possible student-days (total enrollment*number of school days).
Student/Administrator ratio is total fall enrollment divided by the number
of administrators in full-time equivalents (FTEs).
Student/Faculty ratio is total fall enrollment divided by the sum of full-time
equivalent classroom teachers and educational support personnel assigned to the
district in October.
NJ Assessment Data The 11th grade assessment that I use for the primary anal-
ysis is the High School Proficiency Test (HSPT); testing using the HSPT began in
1991 and continued through 2000. This was replaced in 2002 by the High School
Proficiency Assessment (HSPA).
The state reports the average scale score and fraction of students in each district
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who pass each state assessment in the annual school report card data. An electronic
version of these data is available starting with the 1997-98 school year. The figure
reported in the report card historical files is the cohort pass rate, which incorporates
multiple administrations of the test for students who fail the first time. Because I
cannot calculate this number from the cross-sectional microdata I use data from only
the fall administration of the test for first-time test takers.
I extend the 11th grade assessment series back in time using paper copies of the
results published by the state in earlier years. I have these district-level scores for
the tests given in 1993 to 2000, which gives me 5 pre-reform data points and 3
post-reform years.
I also obtained restricted student-level results for this exam from the New Jersey
Department of Education for 1995 and 1997-2000. I use the same election criteria for
my analysis that the state uses for reporting the aggregated scores. Only first-time
11th grade test takers are included; special education and limited English proficient
students are excluded.
3.8.3 National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) data




On the Optimal Allocation of Students and Resources in a
System of Higher Education
4.1 Introduction
Approximately 77% of college students in the United States attend public insti-
tutions, where total annual expenditures now exceed $190 billion (NCES, 2005a,b).
Despite the magnitude of public involvement in higher education, and despite the
enormous body of research on the economics of education, economists have not es-
tablished a normative model of how students and resources should be allocated in
a system of public higher education. The aim of this paper is to provide a simple
and tractable framework for the analysis of this issue and to derive several intuitive
results regarding the optimal allocation of students and resources.
Given a distribution of student ability and a limited pool of resources for higher
education, we model the social planner’s decision to establish schools and populate
them with students and resources. Our model is driven by two simple assumptions:
(1) that there is complementarity between resources and student ability in producing
educational outcomes; and (2) that there is a fixed cost to establishing a school.
We show that these assumptions produce a tiered structure that sorts students by
skill and results in discontinuous spending and educational output per student for
essentially identical students at the margin between schools.
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The existence of a fixed cost creates economies of scale, both for individual schools
and for the whole system. Because they can tailor educational spending more closely
to student quality, university systems serving a larger population produce more out-
put per student, holding constant total resources per student. Improved tailoring
raises aggregate social welfare, but it does not benefit all students (i.e., it is not
Pareto improving). In particular, the lowest ability students at each school will
lose when an additional school is introduced into the system, because they will be
dropped into a lower tier. Larger systems with more schools will provide a college
education to a larger fraction of the population, and they will feature a wealthier
and more selective flagship school, at the optimum.
The principal contribution of this paper is that these results, which are broadly
consistent with observed stylized facts, can be derived from a very simple model.
Most states have a hierarchy of postsecondary institutions exhibiting markedly dif-
ferent levels of resources. The most obvious example is California, where the state’s
Master Plan for Higher Education clearly lays out a three tier structure comprised of
the University of California system, the California State University system, and the
California Community Colleges. Even without an explicit plan, most states have a
flagship public university, some number of other four year institutions, and a system
of local community colleges. Students are distributed among these schools largely
on the basis of their measured academic ability, and discontinuous levels of public
spending per student in each tier are strongly and positively associated with aver-
age ability. On average across the country, instructional expenditure per student in
public universities that grant doctorates is more than twice that in community col-
leges. The difference in total expenditures directly relevant to education is higher.1
1Based on authors’ calculations of 2004 data from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System.
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Further, Winston (1999) shows that spending per student and subsidy per student
are generally increasing in student quality in the U.S across all universities.
Our paper is closely related to existing work on systems of educational provision
at the elementary and secondary level, as well as earlier work on competitive (as
distinct from planned) systems of higher education. All of the earlier work that we
are aware of contains explicit consideration of peer effects. Arnott and Rowse (1987)
study an elementary and secondary system from a planning perspective similar to
ours. They consider the allocation of students to various classes within a school,
where students vary in ability and classrooms have a level of resources per student
that applies to all students in the class. Their principal finding is that any type of
partition is possible, depending on the strength of peer effects.2
Peer effects are a central feature of other related work. Rothschild and White
(1995) analyze competitive outcomes in higher education with peer effects and demon-
strate the potential for efficient private provision. Epple and Romano (1998) con-
struct a model of private and public secondary schools in order to analyze the effects
of voucher reforms. Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2003) and Epple, Romano, and Sieg
(2006) consider a model of higher education in which universities compete on quality
and university differentiation is driven by exogenous endowment differences.
The driving force in our model is complementarity in production. The notion that
complementarity leads to positive assortative matching (tiers, in this case) is hardly
new. This is the underlying mechanism in the marriage market model of Becker
(1973), for example. In the education literature, Arnott and Rowse (1987), Bénabou
(1996), Epple and Romano (1998), Epple et al. (2003) and Epple et al. (2006) all
2Effinger and Polborn (1999) work with a model that, on the surface, appears similar to ours. They begin,
however, by assuming that there are two different schools and that some students are innately better served at the
“lower” school. They then solve an allocation problem, under the assumption that attendance at one school versus
the other affects wages in a market with imperfect information.
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derive at least some results that resemble our tiered structure.3 In addition to assum-
ing complementarity between resources and ability, this earlier work considers peer
effects, and, in most cases, outcomes are influenced by the distribution of income.
Our model can be interpreted as a simplified case of much of this earlier work. As
is often the case, simplification yields both benefits and costs. We show that it takes
only two strong (but not unreasonable) assumptions to generate an optimal system
that is broadly consistent with the stylized facts of state higher education systems.
By eliminating peer effects, we demonstrate that complementarity, along with fixed
costs, is sufficient to make a tiered system optimal. Our simple model also allows us
to consider some issues that do not appear in the prior literature. In particular, our
results on resource discontinuities, our analysis of the optimal number of universities,
and our discussion of the selectivity of schools are new, even as they are latent in
earlier work.
We cannot, however, claim to have captured everything that might be impor-
tant in our simple model. As indicated by previous research, markets, peer effects
and associations between income and ability are important in higher education sys-
tems. Transportation costs (and therefore spatial considerations) and the political
economy of education finance are also surely influential. Abstracting from these con-
cerns enables us to isolate the role of complementarity and to build intuition, but
it also eliminates consideration of the ways in which these factors may reinforce or
counteract our findings.
We also believe that our emphasis on a planner’s perspective is of value. In Epple
and Romano (1998), Epple et al. (2003) and Epple et al. (2006), schools compete
with each other by maximizing quality. While this is a reasonable approach, we think
3A strand of the literature that studies continuous optimization problems has touched on the implications of
complementarity between student ability and student quality. Fernandéz and Gaĺı (1999) is an example. That paper
differs significantly from our analysis by considering a continuum of pre-existing schools of exogenous quality.
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that for the case of public universities in state systems, it is more natural to consider
the planner’s problem of maximizing total output across a set of schools. While both
approaches lead to similar mathematical results on sorting, we think that framing
the problem from a planner’s perspective is of heuristic value.
We build up our model incrementally throughout the remainder of the paper.
In section 2, we introduce the key elements of the model. Section 3 describes the
solution when the optimal number of schools is fixed. Section 4 extends the analysis
to consider the optimal number of schools. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are
relegated to the appendix.
4.2 A Description of the Model
We model a social planner’s problem. The planner takes as given the distribution
of students, the amount of resources available, the education production function,
and the fixed cost of establishing a school. The planner chooses the number of
universities, selects which students attend each university, and decides how many
resources to give each university.
We model educational output as a function of student ability and resources per
student at the student’s school. We assume that ability and resources are comple-
mentary. Our assumptions about the distribution of students will be innocuous, but
our assumptions about the curvature of the education production function are key
to our results.
We believe a planner’s problem is attractive both because it is relatively simple
and because it is a good approximation to the real world, where the vast majority of
students attend public institutions. In our model, students are not explicitly decision-
makers. If they were, however, they would all have unanimous preferences to attend
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schools with higher resources per student, because this is the only dimension along
which universities vary. The planner can therefore use selective admissions to produce
the desired allocation. In other words, a planner with control over admissions policy
can satisfy all incentive constraints.
We consider a utilitarian social welfare function, so that the social planner seeks
to maximize the aggregate level of educational output. Distributional considerations
could be modeled by giving the social planner a preference for equality of outcomes
(e.g., a concave social welfare function), equality of expenditure (e.g., a loss function
for school quality disparities), or equality of access (e.g., a loss function for selec-
tive admissions). Courant, McPherson, and Resch (2006) argue that distributional
considerations may affect the design of higher education because higher education
may be a useful instrument for smoothing preexisting differences in welfare. We ac-
knowledge that distributional concerns are interesting, but we focus on the utilitarian
case to maintain simplicity and because we believe it is a good characterization of
higher education (as opposed to primary and secondary education), where selective
admissions prevail and there is typically no presumption of education for all.4
We do not consider peer effects. They are not needed to obtain any of our results,
and omitting them simplifies the model and makes the mechanics more transparent.
Previous research has included both peer effects and expenditures per student as
inputs to education (Arnott and Rowse, 1987; Epple and Romano, 1998; Effinger
and Polborn, 1999; Epple et al., 2003), clouding the issue of what drives the model.
Our results show that complementarity is sufficient for educational sorting.
The education produced by an individual student is denoted by h(x, r), where x
4There is a class of concave social welfare functions that we could employ without changing any qualitative
results. This leads to limited additional insight, at the cost of significant additional notation. A sufficient condition
for our results to hold is that the transformation U(h(·)) be supermodular and concave, where h(·) is the education
production function and U(·) is the social welfare function. The conditions on U(·) and h(·) that ensure this have
no obvious economic interpretation.
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is that student’s ability and r is the resources per student at the student’s school.
Ability follows a continuous, differentiable cumulative distribution, F (x), with a
probability density function denoted by f(x) and a finite support bounded by x and
x.5
To establish a school, the planner pays a fixed cost, θ, and then purchases the
variable input into education. We assume that all students at a school receive the
same resources per student. In effect, educational resources at the school are a
congestible public good. For any level of total resources that a school provides, the
level of resources per student depends only on the number of students in the school.
We assume that the education production function, h(x, r), is continuous, twice
differentiable, and increasing and concave in each argument. Logically, output should
be increasing in ability and resources. We also suppose that it is concave in each
element. As a normalization, we assume that students with zero resources produce
zero output, and we restrict the domain of h to weakly positive values of resources.
Finally, we assume that the education output function exhibits complementarity.
This may also be called supermodularity, and it is equivalent to a positive cross
partial derivative.
h = h(x, r)
h1 > 0 h11 < 0
h2 > 0 h22 < 0
h12 > 0 h(x, 0) = 0
Only complementarity should be a controversial assumption. Complementarity means
that, at any given level of resources per student, higher ability students produce more
when given a marginal increase in resources. While it is not obvious that this is true
in all cases, we find it to be a plausible assumption. We note also that it is pervasive
5A finite support is not necessary generally, but it will be required when we later assume a uniform distribution.
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in the literature (Arnott and Rowse, 1987; Epple et al., 2003).
The planner will choose to set up K universities, indexed by k = 1, . . . , K. The
planner must pay θK in fixed costs from the total available resources T . What
remains, R, the resources net of the fixed costs, is partitioned among the schools.
We denote the proportion of R allocated to school k as ρk. The planner must also
partition the distribution F (x) between schools. For each value of x, the planner
allocates a proportion of the distribution to each school, denoted by pk(x). The total
measure of students is denoted by S. The measure of students at a school is denoted
by sk and is equal to S
∫
pk(x)f(x)dx. Thus, the resources per student at a school,




The planner simultaneously chooses the number of universities and the partition
of students and resources. It is useful, however, to write the planner’s problem when
the number of schools is fixed as a sub-problem. We denote the global value function
as V , and the value function when K is fixed as W :
V (T, S, θ) = max
K
W (T, S, θ,K), where






















s.t. θK +R ≤ T
K∑
k=1
ρk ≤ 1 (P1)
ρk ≥ 0 ∀ k
K∑
k=1
pk(x) ≤ 1 ∀ x
pk(x) ≥ 0 ∀ k, x
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Each integral of program P1 represents a school. The output of a school is the
integral of individual student outputs with resources equal to rk, integrated over
pk(x)f(x), the distribution of students assigned to the school.
The first and second constraints are the planner’s budget constraint. The third
disallows “negatively funded” schools. The fourth and fifth restrict the planner’s par-
tition, disallowing negative assignments, while permitting the planner to not educate
some students.
In choosing the optimal number of schools, the planner balances the burden of
paying the additional fixed costs for more schools against the inefficiency of sending
very different types of students to the same school. The planner allocates students
and resources, which implicitly sets the resources per student at each school.
First order conditions for this problem can, at least in principle, be established
using variational methods. In the interest of clarity, we shall instead demonstrate
that the problem can be reduced to a more tractable form.
4.3 The Optimal Allocation When the Number of Universities is Fixed
We begin by isolating the allocation decision, taking the number of schools as
fixed. With a fixed number of universities, the planner’s solution is a mapping from
the set of students and resources into universities. One class of partitions of the
type space involves grouping the highest ability types together in one school, then
grouping the next highest ability types in a second school, and so on. We call this a
monotonic partition.
Definition 1. A partition is monotonic if and only if, for least and greatest elements
xk and xk in each school, a student x is assigned to school k if and only if xk ≤ x ≤
xk.
6
6Alternatively, this could be stated as, for least and greatest elements xk and xk in each school, pk(x) = 0 if
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Any partition that results in one school having both higher and lower ability
students than another school cannot be monotonic. Any partition that puts two stu-
dents of the same type into different schools cannot be monotonic. Supermodularity
(complementarity) of the underlying education production function is a sufficient
condition to make the optimal partition monotonic.
Proposition IV.1. If h(x, r) is complementary (supermodular), then the optimal
partition of students is monotonic.7
Supermodularity is sufficient to generate educational sorting, even when there are
no peer effects. Imagine, instead, a non-monotonic partition between two schools.
The allocation can be improved by replacing a lower ability student with a higher
ability student in the school with more resources per student.
Corollary 1. In any optimal monotonic partition, any school that has higher ability
students than another school will also have higher resources per student.
Resources and ability are complements. This immediately leads to the conclusion
that universities with higher ability students should have more resources per student.
Proposition IV.1 tells us the shape of the optimal solution, allowing us to rewrite
program P1. The planner sets an admissions policy by determining the lowest ability
type admitted to each school.8 We denote the highest type assigned to school k by
x < xk or x > xk and pk(x) = 1 if xk < x < xk.
7All proofs are in the appendix.
8There will be no gaps between the lowest type in one school and the highest type in the next school; otherwise
total output could be increased by giving a higher ability student the place of a student at the lower school.
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ak, with a0 denoting the lowest type at the lowest school.
9
V (T, S, θ) = max
K
W (T, S, θ,K), where






















s.t. θK +R ≤ T (P2)




ρk ≥ 0 ∀ k
Program P2 has one fewer constraint than program P1, and the suboptimization
problem for W is a standard static optimization problem. One can easily construct a
Lagrangean and characterize the first-order conditions for any given K. In principle,
the planner can find the optimal allocation for each value of K that is feasible, then
choose the best among these.
We find significant heuristic value in further simplifying the problem. First, we
assume that the distribution of student ability is uniform on [0, 1]. This simplifies
notation, but does not substantively affect any interpretations. Second, we normalize
S to 1. Third, for the remainder of this section only, we assume that the number of
schools is fixed at two. Again, this substantially clarifies the tension in the model,
and all of the following results are easily translatable to other values of K.
Under these additional assumptions, the planner chooses one value of ρ, the pro-
portion of resources to be allocated to the lower school, and two cut-off conditions,
the lowest ability type admitted to the lower school, a, and the lowest ability type
9I.e., pk(x) = 1 for x ∈ [ak−1, ak] and pk(x) = 0 otherwise.
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admitted to the higher school, b.
max
a,b,ρ



















s.t. 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ 1 (P3)
0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1
First-order necessary conditions for an interior solution follow from the unconstrained
optimization problem. At an interior optimum, the Lagrange multipliers on the












































































dx = 0 (4.3)












h2 (x, r2) dx = 0 (4.1b)





h2 (x, r1) dx = 0 (4.2b)










h2 (x, r2) dx = 0 (4.3b)
Equation 4.1 states that the full marginal output of a dollar spent at either school
must be the same in equilibrium. Educational production per student depends not
10The other inequality constraints, a = b, b = 1, ρ = 0, and ρ = 1 all imply that one university is empty and
unused. This cannot be optimal. Whenever the fixed cost has been paid, the optimal allocation uses all available
schools to tailor resources per student. In the Cobb-Douglas case, which we explore in detail below, with x = 0,
a = 0 will not bind because the lowest student produces zero.
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only on the total budget of a school, but also on the number of students over which
this budget is spread; the key metric is resources per student. The price of an



























Marginal Effect of r2
Marginal Effect of r1
Equation 4.2 describes the condition for the lowest ability person who receives edu-
cation. The first term represents the contribution to education made by the marginal
person when he or she is admitted. The second term represents the reduction in edu-
cation of those already at the school, due to congestion, when an additional student
is added. When the marginal person is added to the school, holding the school’s
total resources fixed, the level of resources per student falls (at a rate of ρR
(b−a)2 ), and
this causes a decrease (in the amount of h2(x, ρR/(b − a))) in production for each
student in the school. Thus, at the optimum, the direct contribution of the marginal
student just offsets the reduction that student causes by congesting resources.
Equation 4.3 describes a similar condition for the marginal student between
schools. Suppose the decision is made to send the best person from the lower school
to the upper school. Their direct contribution rises by the amount h(b, (1−ρ)R
1−b ) −
h(b, ρR
b−a), as a result of attending a school with higher resources per student (recall
from corollary 1 that the higher school will have more resources per student at the
optimum). This gain is exactly equal to the net crowding effect. The other two terms
in 4.3 are the combined marginal benefit in the lower school of moving the student
and the combined marginal loss to the students at the upper school from increased
congestion.
This marginal student faces a discontinuity. He or she would produce discretely
more at the upper school. Because of the complementarity between resources and
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student ability, the students at the better school enjoy more resources per student.
The top person in the lower tier is almost exactly the same as the lowest person in
the upper tier in terms of ability, but there is a discrete gap in their educational
outcomes.
4.4 The Optimal Number of Universities
The above analysis characterized the optimal allocation, taking the number of
schools as fixed. The planner must also choose the optimal number of schools. This
analysis is less straightforward because the problem is discrete.11 We can develop
some intuition by looking at the case where θ = 0, which again allows the use of
standard calculus. When there is no fixed cost, the optimal solution is to tailor the
resources per student to each ability type, with the resources per student rising in
student ability.
Proposition IV.2. If there are no fixed costs (θ = 0), the optimal solution features
a unique level of funding (a unique school) for each student ability that is funded at
a positive level. The optimal amount of resources per student, r(x), is an increasing
function with r′(x) = −h21(x,r(x))
h22(x,r(x))
> 0.
When there are no fixed costs, the planner tailors education quality specifically
for each ability level. The proof of proposition IV.2 solves a basic control problem.
The solution demonstrates that resources will be rising in student ability, and that
the rate of this increase will depend on the curvature of h. Greater complementarity
increases the slope of resources as ability rises. Greater concavity in the value of
resources will dampen the relationship.
11One may wish to appeal to discrete optimization tools such as integer programming to solve such a problem.
Unfortunately, integer programming techniques, such as cutting plane methods, are not applicable because they
require first solving the case where variables are not constrained to be integers. This will not work here because the
objective function is not defined for non-integer values of K.
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When there are fixed costs, the planner can provide only finite tailoring, which
implies that almost all ability types will receive resources different from the infinite
school optimum. This creates both winners and losers. Figure 4.1 shows a hypothet-
ical resources per student function for the no fixed cost case and the same function
when K = 2. For K = ∞, r(x) must be increasing. The area trapped by r(x)
will represent the net resources available, R, when the distribution of ability is uni-
form and measure 1. It is possible, but not necessary, that all students receive some
education in this system.
Suppose that K = 2 is the constrained optimum (which will be the case for some
values of θ). Some measure of students at the bottom may receive no education in
the constrained case. Students between a and b attend the lower tier school, and
students above b attend the upper tier school. The lowest ability students at each
school receive more funding than they would in the case with perfect tailoring. In
general, an increase in the ability to tailor resources will increase total educational
output, but it will not be Pareto improving. The lowest students at each school will
lose if the number of schools increases.
When there are fixed costs, the planner must balance the benefits of tailoring
against the costs of setting up new universities. A graphical representation of the
planner’s global choice provides further intuition. Figure 4.2 shows several hypothet-
ical curves in total resources versus total educational production space. These curves
are the W (T, S, θ,K) value functions from program P2, for several values of K, with
S and θ held constant. Each curve shows how total output changes as total resources
rises, holding fixed the number of schools, and the measure and distribution of stu-
dents. These curves are increasing and concave. The global optimum, V (T, S, θ), is
the upper envelope of these curves.
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A number of comparative statics can be visualized as the expansion or compression
of figure 4.2. Holding T constant, a fall in θ compresses the graph. Each W curve
shifts horizontally to the left, and curves at a higher K shift more. As a consequence,
systems with lower θ will be more productive.
Proposition IV.3. The average product of resources, V
T
, of the optimal system is
rising in the measure of students when resources per student is held constant and
falling in the fixed cost per school.
The second part of proposition IV.3 is rather obvious. Average productivity rises
when more resources are available for education and fewer are required for paying
the fixed cost. The first part follows from the implied economies of scale. Larger
systems will spread the fixed cost over more students, allowing more money to be
used as an input.
Figure 4.2 also provides insight into how the optimal number of universities is
chosen. For the given value of T , the planner will choose the highest curve. Each W
curve begins on the T -axis at T = θK. For T above that point, W is increasing and
concave. If each W satisfies the single-crossing property, then the optimal number
of schools must be rising in T . Currently, we are unable to prove (or disprove) that
the single-crossing property is satisfied without any additional assumptions, though
our intuition is that the property will hold for a fairly broad class of functions. This
property holds in the Cobb-Douglas case, and we can prove several further results
with this functional form.12
Proposition IV.4. If h(x, r) = xαrβ, with 0 < α, β < 1, then the optimal number
of schools, K∗, is weakly rising in total resources, T .
12The assumption of Cobb-Douglas can be slightly relaxed to an assumption that h(x, r) = αrβg(x) without
changing the proof used. We suspect that this property is true for a broader set of h functions, but the current proof
uses the multiplicative separability of Cobb-Douglas, which is a relatively strong assumption.
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Proposition IV.4 implies that richer systems should have more schools, thereby
achieving better tailoring. Note, again, that better tailoring does not mean that all
students benefit. Within each school, there are students who receive more resources
than they would if perfect tailoring were feasible. Thus, there will be losers from
an increase in total system resources if the addition of resources causes a rise in the
number of schools. In particular, some portion of the lowest ability students at any
given school will experience a decrease in educational quality when K rises. Increases
in T are not, therefore, necessarily Pareto-improving, even if resources are dropped
exogenously into the system.
Proposition IV.4 is closely tied to two additional comparative static results, which
relate the optimal number of schools to the fixed cost of establishing a school and to
the size of a system.
Proposition IV.5. If h(x, r) = xαrβ, then the optimal number of schools, K∗, is
rising in the measure of students when resources per student is held constant and
falling in the fixed cost per school.
The intuition behind proposition IV.5 is clear from figure 4.2. A reduction in θ
shifts all the curves to the left. Curves with higher K values shift more. Thus, the
diagram is contracted, and the cut-off points all move to the left. Holding T constant,
K∗ must weakly rise as a result. Raising the measure of students, while keeping total
resources per student constant, has the same effect on the cut-off points.
University systems that serve a larger population, therefore, should be superior
in several ways. Even if they are not richer per student, they should have more
universities. They should do a better job of tailoring educational quality to students,
and they should produce more per dollar of resources and more per student.
Larger university systems will also serve a greater fraction of the ability distribu-
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tion, and they will feature more selective flagship universities.
Conjecture 1. If h(x, r) = xαrβ, then the selectivity of the top university will be
rising in K, holding R constant.
This remains a conjecture, because we have been unable to prove this for the
general case, but there are reasons to believe that the claim is true. First, it is
clearly true in the limit. As the number of schools approaches infinity, the top school
will become arbitrarily selective. Second, we have investigated this claim numerically,
assuming that ability is distributed uniformly on [0, 1]. Our assumptions require that
0 < α < 1 and 0 < β < 1. We performed a grid search over these intervals with a
.1 width, for K = 1 through K = 5.13 For each α, β pair we numerically located the
optimal cut points for each value of K and checked that the selectivity of the top
school is rising in K. This procedure revealed no counterexamples. These examples,
of course, do not prove the conjecture. Note, however, that even if there is some set
of values for α, β and K that generate a counterexample to the claim, the predicted
relationship will likely still emerge in the real world. A similar result about the low
end of the distribution holds in simulations. Systems with more universities will
serve a larger fraction of the distribution.14
We selected additional parameter values and extended the search up to K = 10.
Two examples are provided in figure 4.3 for illustration. When K = 1, the lowest
type admitted to the top school is the same as the lowest type admitted to the
bottom school. As K rises, the lowest type admitted to the top school (AK) also
rises. The limiting argument suggests that as K → ∞, AK → 1, giving a sense
13The numerically estimated solution is very sensitive to starting values when the parameters are near 0 or 1,
which necessitates an extra layer of search. We checked many values close to 0 and 1, and we performed a finer grid
search over the middle of the parameter space (from .2 to .8) where starting value sensitivity is reduced.
14An alternative approach is to calibrate the model. We prefer the grid search primarily because we do not believe
there is a reliable way to calibrate α and β. Since we find no contradictions to our claim throughout the entire
parameter space, we feel that the grid search is more comprehensive than a calibrated example, which would focus
on a single pair of α and β.
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of how these curves would project forward. A corresponding shape exists for the
lowest student admitted to the bottom school, with this value approaching 0 in the
limit. The corresponding curves have a similar shape for each of the large number
of parameter value pairs that we have examined.
These results suggest that schools in states with a larger number of universities
should have more selective flagships. Descriptive data from the Integrated Postsec-
ondary Education Data System on university characteristics in 2001 support this
hypothesis.15 Figure 4.4 plots the 75th percentile of the combined SAT scores for
students at each state’s flagship university against the number of two- and four-year
public universities in that state. It is clear from the graph that states which have
more institutions (better tailoring) feature a more selective flagship university. Fig-
ure 4.5 plots the percentage of applicants admitted by the flagship university against
the number of public universities in that state. The data again suggest that larger
university systems have more selective flagships.
4.5 Extensions and Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to provide a framework for analyzing the optimal
allocation of students and resources within a system of higher education. Our hope
is that future research will enrich the model and test its implications.
Our model does not include tuition.16 At the optimum, the social cost of moving
a student from their assigned university to a better one is the change in their educa-
tional output minus the net crowding effect. If individuals experience a private gain
from educational output, there will be some measure of students at any university
for whom the private gain from a university upgrade will outweigh the total social
15These data are available at http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/.
16The existing literature primarily considers tuition policies that enable ability screening for schools maximizing
quality (e.g., Epple and Romano (1998); Epple et al. (2003, 2006)).
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cost. This suggests that there are gains to be made by allowing students to pay for
an upgrade.
Similarly, students might be willing to pay a premium to attend a university out
of state. If the social planner’s objective function includes only the education of
in-state residents, the optimal tuition policy will be to admit out-of-state students
as long as their tuition, at the margin, exceeds the current resources per student at
a school. In general, the introduction of tuition policy will make the total amount
of system resources an endogenous variable.
Our model also makes empirical predictions about the relationship between the
number of universities in a system and the selectivity of its flagship university and
about the effects of introducing an additional university to a system. When new
universities are introduced, our model suggests that some types of students will
experience a reduction in educational quality, while others will experience an increase.
At the same time, overall educational output, and the marginal value of additional
revenue, should rise with the introduction of a new university. Our hope is that
future research will utilize variation in the fixed cost (e.g., land grants, changes in
federal support) and the size of the population (e.g., migration, the Baby-Boom) to
test and further refine our findings.
In this paper, we focused on a deliberately simple model. Nevertheless, it cap-
tures a number of key features about the provision of public higher education. In
particular, our model offers a normative explanation for a tiered university system,
within which higher ability students receive more resources. It highlights the tradeoff
inherent in tailoring education quality to student ability. It also provides a model for
understanding the optimal number of universities in a system, and makes suggestions
about how university systems should vary.
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4.6 Appendix
Proposition IV.1. If h(x, r) is complementary (supermodular), then the optimal
partition of students is monotonic.
Proof: Fix the number of schools and the resources in each school.17 Suppose the
optimal partition is not monotonic. Call the two schools that violate monotonicity 1
and 2, and, without loss of generality, assume 1 has the higher resources per student.
If monotonicity fails, then ∃ y ∈ 1 < z ∈ 2. The proposed solution produces
h(y, r1) + h(z, r2). Switching the two students yields h(y, r2) + h(z, r1). And,
h(y, r2) + h(z, r1) > h(y, r1) + h(z, r2)⇔
h(z, r1)− h(z, r2) > h(y, r1)− h(y, r2)
which is a definition of supermodularity, since z > y and r1 > r2. QED.
Corollary 1. In any optimal monotonic partition, any school that has higher ability
students than another school will also have higher resources per student.
Proof: Suppose that the optimal partition is monotonic, with students in 1 being
higher ability than students in 2, but with r2 > r1. By supermodularity, swapping
any two students between schools raises output. QED.
Proposition IV.2. If there are no fixed costs (θ = 0), the optimal solution features
a unique level of funding (a unique school) for each student ability that is funded at
a positive level. The optimal amount of resources per student, r(x), is an increasing
function with r′(x) = −h21(x,r(x))
h22(x,r(x))
> 0.
Proof: Part I: Suppose that there is a school with positive resources and two or
more distinct ability types. Then there exists some school with both y and z with
17Clearly, if any two schools provide the same resources per student, there would be economies of scale gains to
merging the schools. Thus, we can proceed as if the resources per student differs at each school.
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z > y. Let s denote the total measure of students at the school. Without loss of
generality, suppose that the measure of each type is the same, s/2. Then, the output




















where ε = 0 and total funding at the school is ρR. We show that it is optimal to set
















The last inequality follows directly from supermodularity and contradicts the opti-
mality of the proposed solution.










It can easily be shown that the Hamiltonian leads to a degenerate solution with
h2(x, r(x)) = β ∈ R. This is an implicit function, and the conditions of the implicit
function theorem are satisfied because h22(·) 6= 0. The implicit function theorem







Proposition IV.3. The average product of resources, V
T
, of the optimal system is
rising in the measure of students when resources per student is held constant and
falling in the fixed cost per school.
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Proof: Fix T and S. Lowering θ relaxes the resource constraint for any value of K.
V (T, S, θ) must therefore rise. Since T is fixed, V
T
must rise.
A rise in the measure of students when resources per student is held constant
means that S rises but T
S
is fixed. We can write this as a γ proportional change,
with γ > 1. Denote the value function as W (T, S, θ,K). For any value of K, output
per dollar of total resources can be written:
















































W (T, S, θ,K)
T
The second equality uses the envelope theorem, which tells us that the optimal
cut-points will not change when the parameters are varied in small amounts. The






> 0. Since this is true of any K, it
must be true for the optimal K. QED.
Proposition IV.4. If h(x, r) = xαrβ, with 0 < α, β < 1, then the optimal number
of schools, K∗, is weakly rising in total resources, T .
Proof: Define W (T, S, θ,K) to be the constrained solution, when the number of
universities is fixed at K, and denote the derivative of W (·) with respect to T by
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WT . In the Cobb-Douglas case, we can relate W and WT :























































The vector of ρ and a values that maximize the objective function will also maximize
the marginal value of resources, WT , since WT is an affine transformation of W :
WT (T, S, θ,K) =
β
T−θKW (T, S, θ,K). Now, consider any two numbers of universities,
with K > K̂:
WT (T, S, θ,K) =
β
T − θK








W (T, S, θ, K̂)
= WT (T, S, θ, K̂)
Since the derivative of W with respect to T is higher the higher is K, the family of W
functions will satisfy the single crossing property in the T−W plane. For eachK > K̂
and T > T̂ , W (T̂ , S, θ,K) > W (T̂ , S, θ, K̂) ⇒ W (T, S, θ,K) > W (T, S, θ, K̂). As
is illustrated in figure 4.2, W will be zero up until T = θK. So, W functions with
higher K values start rising at a later point.
V (T, S, θ), the optimum when K is a choice variable, is the upper envelope of
the family of W functions in figure 4.2. Because of the single crossing property, this
upper envelope must lie on a W for a weakly higher K as T rises. Thus, K∗ is rising
in T . QED.
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Proposition IV.5. If h(x, r) = xαrβ, then the optimal number of schools, K∗, is
rising in the measure of students when resources per student is held constant and
falling in the fixed cost per school.
Proof: Define T ∗(i, j) as the T that solves W (T ∗(i, j), S, θ, i) = W (T ∗(i, j), S, θ, j),










dx. For the Cobb-
Douglas case, as is shown in the proof of proposition IV.4, W (T, S, θ,K) = S1−β(T −
θK)βQ(K). Therefore, T ∗(i, j), which will be unique if it exists by the single-crossing
property from proposition IV.4, solves
S1−β(T ∗(i, j)− θi)βQ(i) = S1−β(T ∗(i, j)− θj)βQ(j) (4.5)
Without loss of generality, assume i < j. Totally differentiate equation 4.5 with
respect to T and θ:
(dT ∗(i, j)− idθ)βS1−β(T ∗(i, j)− θi)β−1Q(i)





jβS1−β(T ∗(i, j)− θj)βQ(j)− iβS1−β(T ∗(i, j)− θi)β−1Q(i)
βS1−β(T ∗(i, j)− θj)βQ(j)− βS1−β(T ∗(i, j)− θi)β−1Q(i)
=
jWT (T
∗(i, j), S, θ, j)− iWT (T ∗(i, j), S, θ, i)
WT (T ∗(i, j), S, θ, j)−WT (T ∗(i, j), S, θ, i)
> 0
The last two steps follow directly from the analysis in the proof of proposition IV.4.
This shows that all cut-off points rise when θ rises. This implies that, when T is held
constant, a rise in θ must weakly decrease the number of cut-off points passed with
total resources T , which is equivalent to a weakly falling K∗.
For the size result, note that W (γT, γS, θ,K) = (γS)1−β(γT − γ θ
γ
K)βQ(K) =
γW (T, S, θ
γ
, K). Since γ does not depend on any of the parameters, the cut-off
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points for the γW (T, S, θ
γ
, K) system are equivalent to the cut-off points for the
W (T, S, θ
γ
, K) system. Thus, an increase in the measure of students, holding constant
total resources per student, which is equivalent to choosing γ > 1, is equivalent in
its effect on K∗ to a reduction of θ to θ
γ
. Since K∗ was proved above to be weakly
falling in θ, it must be weakly rising in the measure of students. QED.
4.7 Figures
Figure 4.1: Resources per Student as a Function of Student Ability
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Figure 4.2: Total Output versus Total Resources for Several Values of K
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Data include all 36 states with available SAT scores from the 2001 Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System. A
regression of 75th Percentile SAT scores at the state flagship on the number of colleges in a state yields the following
estimates: SAT = 1213 (14) + 1.52 (.29) * Number of Schools + error, where standard errors are in parentheses.
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Data include all 45 states with available admissions data from the 2001 Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System.
A regression of fraction admitted to the flagship on the number of colleges in a state yields the following estimates: Fraction
Admitted = 107 (15) * -1.00 (.20) Number of Schools + error, where standard errors are in parentheses.
CHAPTER V
Conclusion
Together, the three essays in this dissertation cover aspects of the distribution
and value of resources through all levels of public education in the United States.The
Abbott case has very positive and very negative conclusions. New Jersey succeeded
in dramatically increasing the resources available to urban schools but failed to put
any forethought into how they would gauge success. The state had the opportunity
to learn a tremendous amount about the costs and benefits of various educational
programs and interventions. The results in the first two essays show that Abbott
districts increased spending and that the achievement of some students improved
dramatically, but the data do not exist to determine which programs or expenditures
led to the measured increases. The third essay, starts at the opposite end of the
spectrum. Starting with just a budget and knowledge of how student ability and
resources interact, we show how to allocate students and resources across schools
to produce the most educational output. All three essays lead to more unanswered
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